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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on insurer and provider interactions. The
first addresses an important policy question: whether or not the fear of medical
malpractice liability induces physicians to over-utilize medical services and/or
avoid treating risky patients. Commonly known as defensive medicine, such
behaviour, if it occurs, implies that liability costs borne by physicians can adversely affect the cost and quality of health care. Despite widespread reports of
defensive medicine in surveys of physicians, empirical investigations have produced conflicting evidence that defensive medicine is practiced on a significant
scale. In several countries, the United States in particular, this lack of empirical verification has confounded efforts to formulate, implement, and evaluate various tort reforms intended to lower costs and improve access to medical care. This paper develops an innovative model of the interaction between
patients, physicians, and health insurers that provides a unified framework
within which the existing empirical findings can be understood. The model generates two types of equilibrium, and predicts the opposite effects of changes in
the malpractice environment on health care expenditure and quality to emerge
in each type. In particular, when malpractice pressure is low, increasing pressure causes increases in both health care quality and expenditure. At high levels of malpractice liability, however, further increases in pressure induce quality and expenditure to decrease. These non-monotonic predictions provide an
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explanation for the apparent conflicts and inconsistencies in the existing empirical literature. The model also provides policy guidance as the two equilibrium types are fully distinguished by the level of patient access to physicians.
Thus, where measures of access (waiting times, incidences of late treatment,
distance travelled for medical procedures) are at feasibly low levels, decreases
in malpractice pressure cause reductions in health care expenditures and some
loss of quality, but where these measures are high, the same reductions have
the opposite effect. This implies that efforts at tort reform should be informed
by data on patient access to physicians services in order to accurately anticipate effects on quality and expenditure.
The next chapter expands the model by making physicians mobile, and includes a location decision as a new margin of defensive behaviour. The empirical literature on the subject of defensive medicine includes studies utilizing
data at the state or county level. Such jurisdictional studies typically find the
least evidence that rising malpractice liability costs induce cost-increasing or
quality-reducing practices by physicians. A key assumption in these studies
is that changes in malpractice pressure have no cross-jurisdictional effects on
health care spending and quality. This could be a strong assumption where
physicians are mobile and malpractice pressure influences their location decisions. If malpractice pressure influences physicians’ location decisions, then
physician mobility represents a potential channel for such cross-jurisdictional
effects. This paper constructs a theoretical model where insurers compete
to provide consumers with health insurance while facing mobile physicians.
Analytical and numerical results show that, through this mobility channel,
changes in malpractice pressure unique to one jurisdiction do influence health
care spending and quality in other jurisdictions. This introduces the possibility of omitted variable bias in estimates of the effects of changes in malpractice
pressure, and drives a wedge between the direct and aggregate effects.
The final chapter investigates the responses of payers and providers to an
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innovation in provider compensation: competitive bidding for patients. The
rise of managed care and pressure to reduce health care spending have made
prospective payment and capitation the dominant methods for health insurers to compensate health care providers in the United States. This can be
problematic where providers (but not insurers) can observe patient heterogeneity within payment categories. This informational advantage can induce
providers to practice risk selection: retaining only those patients believed to be
low cost patients, and leaving expected high-cost patients without treatment
or relegated to expensive and inefficient emergency room care. This problem
can be modelled as a game between a principle (health insurer) and multiple agents (providers), an environment where auctions have proven useful at
inducing agents to reveal private information. This paper constructs a multistage provider reimbursement system wherein unselected patients are allocated using competitive bidding. This modelling approach allows the analysis
of the trade-off between selection and efficiency under competitive bidding. The
study finds that a mixed system of competitive bidding and capitation dominates a pure bidding system, and sufficient conditions for dominance of a pure
capitation system. Overall, competitive bidding eliminates risk selection in
equilibrium without sacrificing efficiency.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A consistent, ongoing debate in countries all over the developed world concerns
both the level of and grown in health care expenditure. Dissatisfaction is routinely expressed with the burden of health care expenditure on government
budgets, the allocation of scarce medical resources and services, and the level
of access to care enjoyed by vulnerable populations. Despite decades of debate
and research into various ways to structure health care systems, and a variety
of alternatives attempted in the past or in use today, no dominant structure has
emerged. Further complicating the debate is the lack of a clear positive relationship between the amount of health care expenditure and various measures
of system quality. This in turn leads to speculation that health care systems,
as structured today, contain inefficiencies that produce suboptimal outcomes,
and that “throwing money” at the problem is not a viable solution.
Economists have been making contributions to this debate for at least fifty
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years. Kenneth Arrow, in his seminal paper Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care (1963), outlines several characteristics that make health
care “special”, and distinct from other goods and services. As the title indicates, much of the distinction is made in the degree of uncertainty faced by
health insurers, health care providers, and patients as they interact in health
care systems. In the decades since this article’s publication, those working in
the field of health economics have produced further insights into the nature of
this uncertainty. In many cases, the uncertainty faced by one party in a health
care system concerns private information held by another party. For example,
health insurers must form expectations over the cost of a policyholder’s treatment, while policyholders may have some idea of their idiosyncratic health
risk, or preference for utilizing health services. Depending on the structure of
a health care system, policyholders can find it in their best interest to strategically withhold this private information from other parties. As Arrow’s article
points out, these information problems call into question whether competitive
market create efficient outcomes, and whether alternative structures can produce improvements.
The three chapters comprising this thesis are intended as a contribution
to the study of the information and commitment problems that set health care
apart from other goods and services, particularly those that arise during the interactions between health insurers or payers and health care providers. They
use game theory to model these interactions, and examine the consequences
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to the cost and quality of health care when these interactions are shocked
by changes in external factors. The external factor examined in the first two
chapters is the medical malpractice liability costs faced by physicians. These
models investigate physician behaviour in response to changes in malpractice
costs, and how health insurers would compensate for this behaviour by adjusting contracts and affecting physician incentives. The behaviour of both parties
reveals predictions of the effects of changes in malpractice liability costs on
health care spending and quality. With these predictions come the first explanation for seeming inconsistencies and discrepancies in the results of dozens
of empirical investigations into these relationships, and offer clues regarding
alternative model specifications for future studies. The third chapter investigates the selection problems that can arise when differences in payers’ reimbursement rates do not capture all underlying heterogeneity across patients in
expected treatment costs. It develops a model for comparing reimbursement
by capitation with one utilizes competitive bidding in the allocation of patients
across providers. It shows the usefulness of competitive bidding in overcoming
this selection problem, and reveals the conditions under which a system with
competitive bidding provides higher quality and lower cost health insurance
than a pure capitation system.

4

Chapter 2
The Hidden Evidence of
Defensive Medicine

2.1

Introduction

An important question among researchers and policymakers is whether or not
medical malpractice liability costs affect either the cost or quality of consumer
health insurance. Liability costs could affect health care spending directly,
through the passing of physicians’ malpractice insurance premiums on to patients and health insurers, or indirectly, by changing the way physicians practice medicine. The sum of all malpractice premiums each year makes up less
than two percent of total annual health care spending. Therefore, if there exist any policy-relevant relationships between malpractice liability costs and
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health care spending and quality, they must arise due to the effects on physician behaviour. The treatment decisions made by physicians primarily to avoid
malpractice liability rather than benefit patients are commonly known as defensive medicine. Positive defensive medicine is the over-utilization of medical
services in an effort to forestall claims of negligence, while negative defensive
medicine is the avoidance of risky patients or procedures believed likely to result in malpractice claims. Such behaviour illustrates the potential for adverse
relationships to exist between the liability costs born by physicians, often called
“malpractice pressure”, and both the cost and quality of the health care enjoyed
by consumers.
Widespread reports of defensive medicine in surveys of physicians have led
to calls for liability-reducing reforms. The two most recent US Presidents,
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, both promoted malpractice reform as a
legitimate policy option for reducing health care spending in the 2007 and
2011 State of the Union Addresses, respectively. The goal of such policies is
the reduction of wasteful medical spending, making health insurance more affordable and thus improving consumers’ access to care. Researchers have investigated the benefits of malpractice reform for two decades using utilization,
spending, and quality data. Unlike the physician surveys, however, these studies have produced inconsistent and often conflicting findings. Depending on
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the populations studied and measures used for key variables, different studies have uncovered positive, negative, and even no statistically significant relationships between malpractice pressure and spending or quality. Without
consistent findings in the data, empirical evidence to corroborate the physician
surveys has remained elusive. In several countries, the United States in particular, this lack of empirical verification has confounded efforts to formulate,
implement, and evaluate tort reforms. As the US is in the midst of healthcare
reform, and spending on health care approaches 20% of GDP, insight into the
practice and effects of defensive medicine would be timely.
Both the discrepancy between physician surveys and empirical studies, as
well as the mixed empirical findings, have been noted in the literature (Helland
& Showalter 2009, Lakdawalla & Seabury 2009, Sloan & Shadle 2009, Avraham & Shanzenbach 2010, Reyes 2010, Cotet 2012). An explanation for these
discrepancies, however, has been lacking. Aggregation could play a role, since
studies utilizing broad data sets tend to find weak relationships while studies
focused on particular medical specialties, patient demographics, or geographic
regions tend to find strong relationships that conflict with one another. If the
relationships vary qualitatively across narrowly defined populations, then the
aggregation of populations in a broad study would cancel and produce weak or
inconclusive relationships over the entire sample. This does not explain why
changes in malpractice pressure would affect one population differently than
another. Without knowing this, it is difficult to understand the differences in
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the existing empirical findings or predict how different populations would be
affected by proposed malpractice reforms.
This is the first paper to provide an explanation for these discrepancies. It
presents an innovative model of the interaction between patients, physicians,
and health insurers that provides a unified framework within which the existing empirical findings can be understood. Ultimately, the model is a decision
problem on the part of an insurer involving whether and how to structure its
contracts with physicians as malpractice pressure increases. There are three
main analytical predictions of the model. First, two types of equilibrium can
occur, one of which is a corner solution and the other an interior solution. Second, these two equilibrium types exhibit the opposite comparative statics from
one another concerning malpractice pressure and both health care cost and
quality. Finally, rising malpractice pressure can trigger a switch from one type
of equilibrium to the other. This creates a non-monotonicity in the relationships between malpractice pressure and both health care quality and expenditure. Specifically, both health care spending and quality rise initially with
malpractice pressure. These effects are positive up to a threshold, after which
any further increases in pressure produce negative effects. These relationships
are non-monotonic despite both the incentive for physicians to behave defensively and the actual practice of defensive medicine in equilibrium at all levels
of malpractice pressure. It is the non-monotonicity that can leave evidence of
defensive medicine hidden from empirical methods designed to investigate for
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monotonic relationships.
These predictions are broadly consistent with the literature. Data focusing
on specialties facing relatively low malpractice pressure tend to report positive
relationships, while those with high malpractice pressure reveal negative relationships. In addition to the explanation for the empirical discrepancies, the
model suggests a novel use for measures of access to distinguish observations
in one type of equilibrium from those in the other, as well as the prevailing
equilibrium type of a given population. This is useful in specifying models to
evaluate past tort reforms and form expectations of the effects of any future
reforms.

2.2

Empirical Literature

Surveys of physicians regularly report the widespread practice of defensive
medicine. Over 90% of physician respondents over-utilize medical resources
due to liability concerns (Studdert at al 2005, Dove et al 2010, Paik et al 2011,
Sethi et al 2012). In other surveys, between 16% and 64% of physicians limit
the performance of high-risk procedures or avoid patients considered more
likely to file claims (Bovbjerg et al 1996, Lumalcuri & Hale 2010, Reyes 2010).
Fear of liability has been the most cited reason for stopping the practice of obstetrics (Lumalcuri & Hale 2010), and for medical residents to relocate (Mello
& Kelly 2005). While these studies note that the high profile of malpractice
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premiums in medical circles could inflate the importance of defensive medicine
in survey responses, they indicate a consistent and genuine belief that liability
costs produce adverse effects on the cost and quality of health care. It may
therefore follow that reforms designed to reduce malpractice pressures would
spur reductions in wasteful medical procedures, while also increasing access to
care for high-risk procedures and patients. Based on this, the American Medical Association advocates for malpractice reform under the belief that doing
so would significantly slow the rising cost of health care in the US while also
increasing health care quality through improved access. Taken together, the
survey responses and efforts to reform the malpractice system reflect a widely
held belief in the medical establishment that defensive medicine is a serious
problem and that malpractice reform would pay considerable dividends.
Contrary to physician surveys, the results of empirical studies investigating the practice of defensive medicine demonstrate considerable inconsistency.
Over a span of two decades, empirical works have uncovered mixed evidence
of any policy-relevant relationships between malpractice pressure and either
the cost or quality of health care. Baicker & Chandra (2005) found little evidence that malpractice pressure affects physicians’ location decisions or treatment choices. Later analysis turned up significant but relatively modest effects. At the state level, elasticities of total Medicare spending per beneficiary
to malpractice premiums or payments are estimated at 0.06 to 0.1 (Baicker
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et al 2007). Hellinger & Encinosa (2006) found that US states adopting legislation capping awards for noneconomic damages due to medical malpractice
experienced between 3.25% and 3.4% lower per-capita health care expenditure
than states without caps. Also utilizing state-level tort reform as exogenous
reductions in malpractice pressure, Sloan & Shadle (2009) found that reforms
generally had no significant effect on expenditure or quality of care enjoyed
by Medicare patients suffering from heart attack, breast cancer, diabetes, or
stroke. These studies suggest limited scope for tort reform to produce reductions in health care expenditure on a national scale.
The literature also contains studies finding relatively large effects of malpractice pressure on health care cost and quality. Kessler & McClellan (1996)
found that certain tort reforms were able to lower hospital expenditures on
elderly Medicare patients suffering heart attack and heart disease between
5% and 9%, without significantly affecting the quality of care. A later study
(Kessler & McClellan 2002) uncovered similar effects, although stronger for diagnostic rather than therapeutic services. The authors interpret these findings
as evidence that defensive medicine is practiced on a significant scale, and their
estimates are heavily cited in arguments promoting the benefits of malpractice
reform. Other studies produce similar large effects on health care spending. A
recent working paper (Lakdawalla & Seabury 2009) utilizing county-level data
mostly from California and New York found that rising malpractice pressure
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was responsible for approximately 15% of the growth in health care spending over the 1990s. The authors also estimate, however, that the cost-savings
would be outweighed by reductions in health care quality. State-level reforms
designed to reduce liability exposure have been found to reduce various measures of health care utilization, such as hospital admissions, surgeries, outpatient visits (Cotet 2012), mechanical ventilation and length of stay in hospital
(Moriya 2011). Overall, these studies indicate a positive effect of malpractice
pressure on the cost of health care, and at least a weakly positive effect on
health care quality through increased utilization.
In contrast to the studies positive effects, several others examining obstetrics have found the effects to be significantly negative. A widely cited paper
using national US data (Dubay et al 2001) found that higher malpractice premiums were associated with a lower incidence of timely prenatal care. Where
the timing of care is a vital component of health care quality, these findings
indicate tort reforms would deliver improvements in quality rather than reductions. Delivery by cesarean section is often associated with defensive behaviour since it is an expensive alternative to vaginal birth and is widely believed among physicians to reduce the complications most likely to result in
malpractice claims (Yang et al 2009). State-specific investigations into an effect of malpractice pressure on the use of cesarean section vary considerably,
from positive (Localio et al 1993, Yang et al 2009, Shurtz 2010) to negative
(Tussing & Wojtowycz 1992) to no apparent relationship (Baldwin et al 1995).
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A well-cited national study by Currie & MacLeod (2008) found that limits on
noneconomic damage awards increase the use of cesarean section, and tort reforms thought to make physicians more legally responsible for their own treatment decisions had the opposite effect. The negative relationships found indicate that, in at least some cases, malpractice pressure reduces expenditure in
obstetrics by decreasing the use of expensive alternative treatments. Given the
findings from studies using data from obstetrics, tort reforms could produce the
opposite of their expected effect in certain medical specialties. This has created
questions as to whether any benefits of malpractice reform are generalizable
across patient populations (Congressional Budget Office 2004).
A relatively consistent aspect of the literature is the effect of changes in
malpractice pressure on patients’ access to care. The relationship appears to
be weakly negative where access is measured in timeliness of prenatal care
(Dubay et al 2001), physicians’ hours worked (Helland & Showalter 2009), and
rates of consumer health insurance coverage (Avraham & Shanzenbach 2010).
The relationships become more negative as patients’ socioeconomic status declines (Dubay et al 2001) and for patients living in rural areas (General Accounting Office 2003). While the empirical findings on access to care fit qualitatively with physicians’ survey responses, the inconsistent and often conflicting results on spending and quality have led policymakers to question whether
defensive medicine is an important factor in rising health care expenditure.
Empirical work on the importance of defensive medicine and the viability of
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malpractice reform continues, notably with recent advances in the anticipation
effects of tort reform (Malani & Reif 2010), as well as physicians’ sensitivity
to framing in surveys and long-run specialization effects (Reyes 2010). Based
on the existing body of empirical work, however, the evidence on the relationships between malpractice pressure and both the cost and quality of consumer
health care is unclear, and certainly at odds with the beliefs of the medical
establishment.

2.3

Theoretical Literature

A theoretical basis for the practice of defensive medicine has been established
in the literature. Medical malpractice is classified under tort law, and under
English common law, is subject to a negligence rule of liability. Health care
providers as defendants can be held liable if plaintiffs can show that an injury
occurred, that it was caused by the provider’s medical care, and that such care
deviated from due care (Danzon 2001). The law therefore recognizes that injuries can result from medical care, and that the cost of those injuries should
be born by health care providers if the care was negligent, and alternatively
by patients if the care was non-negligent. Economic theory shows that where
physicians are held perfectly accountable for their treatment decisions under

14

a negligence rule, sufficiently high malpractice penalties would induce physicians to meet the standard of care and have no demand for malpractice insurance (Danzon 1985). Physicians, however, tend to demand full insurance, to
the point of forming physician-owned mutuals to secure coverage whenever it
became scarce in traditional markets (Danzon et al 2004). Real-world physician behaviour, therefore, differs from that predicted under a well-functioning
negligence rule.
As Olbrich (2008) shows, evidentiary uncertainty and positive lawsuit costs
can explain this behaviour. The standard of care itself is subjective, as it consists of the care that a competent physician would reasonably provide in the
same circumstances. The complexity of medical care makes this standard unverifiable, and the reliance on beliefs and opinion thus introduces a random
element onto patients’ decisions to sue and the court’s judgement of negligence.
Determinations of liability depend more on economic loss (Feess 2012) and
treatment success (Kessler 2011) rather than fault, and legal precedents allow
juries to find even customary medical practice as unreasonable, and therefore
negligent (Studdert et al 2004, Moffett & Moore 2011). In addition to the damages that a physician could be forced to pay, lawsuit costs include the legal costs
of their defense as well as the reputational and emotional costs associated with
an accusation of professional negligence (Keren-Paz 2010). Therefore, due to
uncertainty and lawsuit costs, each patient the physician treats represents an
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expected liability cost. The physician’s treatment choice could reduce this liability cost, but it may be impossible or extremely costly to eliminate it entirely.
This is the way malpractice liability costs are modeled in this paper, as well as
in Gal-Or (1999), Currie & MacLeod (2008), Olbrich (2008), and Feess (2012).
Rising malpractice costs could thus induce physicians to engage in defensive
practices to lower their exposure to liability.
This paper follows several theoretical works modeling patients, health insurers, and physicians under the threat of medical malpractice. Examples
include Danzon (1985), Gal-Or (1999), Leger (2000), Zeiler (2004), Arlen &
MacLeod (2005), Olbrich (2008), Kpelitse (2010), and Feess (2012). The model
presented here departs from these models in three ways. First, this paper is
positive in focus whereas the objectives in the existing literature tend to be
normative, such as determining optimal malpractice costs, liability rules, or
contracts between physicians and insurers. While certainly addressing important issues with broad policy implications, these studies nonetheless investigate different questions than are posed in the empirical literature, and
are thus of limited use in explaining the discrepancies that form the basis
of this paper. Second, the workhorse principal-agent framework used in the
literature contains an implicit assumption on the extensive margin of physician behaviour. Typically, a single insurer (principal) induces a single physician (agent) to provide a certain quality of treatment to a single patient. This
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framework is useful for examining health care quality on the intensive margin, but implicitly assumes the number of patients treated by each physician
to be determined exogenously. This is a strong assumption given the frequency
with which physicians report choosing to limit the performance of certain procedures or refraining from treating certain types of patients due to the fear of
malpractice liability. In order to investigate these choices, this model endogenizes physicians’ caseloads as well as the intensity of treatment provided to
the patient1 . Finally, existing studies tend to model information asymmetry between physicians and patients or health insurers as a basis for the contractibility problems that necessitate the use of the principal-agent framework. Physicians tend to have private information over the health status of a given patient,
thus requiring incentive compatibility constraints on any contract guaranteeing the appropriate treatment for a patient of a particular health status. In
trading-off realism for tractability, this paper assumes that physicians and patients are homogenous and thus does not contain information asymmetry. The
model instead exogenously assumes the contractibility problems that arise due
to real-world information asymmetry without explicitly modelling it. Therefore, like the other principal-agent frameworks in the literature, health insurers are able to influence physician behaviour only through incentives rather
than commands.
1

Feess (2012) is another exception in that physicians choose both a degree of care for each
patient in addition to a choice of technology choice, which could be interpreted as a choice
whether to treat at all.
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2.4

The Model

There is a continuum of identical consumers of measure 1, each endowed with
income m. Consumers have the utility function U (H, y), where H is health status and y is consumption, with strictly positive first and cross-partial derivatives2 , as well as strictly negative second derivatives. Each consumer expects
to become ill with probability q and remain healthy with probability 1 −

q. A

healthy consumer enjoys a health status of H1 while an ill consumer enjoys
H2 , where H1 is strictly greater than H2 . Consumers are willing to purchase
health insurance as long as the expected utility (EU ) of owning insurance is at
least as large as the expected utility of going uninsured. The parameters m,
q, H1 , H2 , and the function U (.) are also common knowledge. Since consumers
are identical, a strict preference toward health insurance for a single consumer
results in the entire measure of consumers purchasing health insurance, with
exactly q insured consumers expected to become ill and seek treatment.
If any consumer i with insurance falls ill, he is able to obtain treatment
(ti ) from a physician and will recover with probability 1 −

ρ(ti ), but suffer an

adverse outcome with probability ρ(ti ), a function that is common knowledge.
Ill consumers without insurance have zero probability of recovery. The function
ρ(ti ) is positive, decreasing, strictly convex, continuous, and differentiable with
at least the first, second, and third derivatives being finite for any ti . Assume
that ρ(ti ) is equal to 1 when ti = 0 and approaches zero as ti approaches infinity.
2

For an empirical investigation into these assumptions, see Finkelstein et al (2008).
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Note that these assumptions imply that the first derivative of ρ(ti ) is negative
and the second derivative is positive, while all derivatives approach zero as t
increases. Since ρ(ti ) is always decreasing, the model does not allow treatment
to become harmful to the patient at any level. For this reason, large increases
in treatment are better considered as “gold-plating”; costly inputs that deliver
marginal improvements in care, rather than the potentially harmful continued
administration of any one particular medical treatment.
There is a continuum of identical physicians of measure D, which is common knowledge. There are two margins of physician behaviour of interest in
this paper: the number of patients that each physician chooses to treat, as
well as the amount of treatment the physician devotes to each patient. Given
the significant barriers to entry into the medical profession, and the evidence
that physicians are able to exercise some market power (Thurston 2001), the
measure of physicians is determined exogenously rather than by a clearing
condition in the physician labour market. A fixed measure of physicians prohibits this model from addressing questions of physician mobility or exit in
response to changing malpractice pressure. This is another interesting margin
of behaviour that will be explored in the next chapter3 .
Physicians are risk-neutral income maximizers. Each one receives a revenue w from an insurer for each policyholder treated, as well as a stock of
3

Also see Kessler et al 2005, Mello et al. 2005, Klick & Stratman 2007, and Matsa 2007.
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resources (s) for use in the treatment of policyholders. Resources are a composite of all rivalrous inputs to medical care that can be procured by an insurer
and transferred to a physician. Examples include global budgets (Gaynor et al
2004), access to networks of other medical contractors (Arlen & MacLeod 2005),
or the effective units of time a physician gains through improved support staff,
technology, or software. The pair {w, s} should be considered a reduced form
version of the revenues and resources from any of the main explicit methods
of payment, such as prospective payment or fee-for-service. Intuitively, any explicit contract should leave a physician with a sense of the revenue they can
expect to realize from taking on a patient, as well as the resources at their disposal for their patients’ treatment. This allows the model to abstract away from
the finer details of any one explicit contract and make the incentive compatibility constraints in the insurer’s problem more tractable. Individual physicians
are small relative to a health insurer, and therefore cannot behave strategically, taking both w and s as given.
Physicians incur an expected malpractice liability cost for each patient treated.
Even though most real-world physicians hold malpractice insurance against
legal costs and any settlements or payments, there remain considerable uninsured costs associated with each claim. These include the reputational and
emotional cost due to an accusation of professional negligence, the time and
inconvenience of participating in negotiations or trials, and the prospect that
an award may exceed the limits of coverage. Any insured costs would enter
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the physician’s problem as a fixed cost in the form of a malpractice insurance
premium. Since the measure of physicians is fixed exogenously, any fixed costs
would have no effect in this model, thus insurable costs are normalized to zero.
Given the conditions necessary for a finding of negligence, liability costs are
the result of a sequence of events. First, an injury from medical care must
occur, which happens in the model with probability ρ(ti ). Conditional on an
injury, there is some probability that the patient initiates a malpractice claim.
Conditional on the filing of a claim, potential outcomes include a dropping of
the claim, a settlement, a judgement in favour of the defendant, or a judgement
in favour of the plaintiff, each with an accompanying cost to the physician. Accounting for the effects of the physician’s treatment decision on the relative
probabilities and costs of each potential outcome adds several terms to the
physician’s problem, and greatly complicates the comparative statics. Instead,
as in Currie & MacLeod (2008), liability costs are assumed to enter the physician’s objective function in a reduced-form way. Let the uninsurable expected
liability cost of treating patient i be g(ti , P ); a function of the resources dedicated to the patient by the physician (ti ), and a parameter serving as a measure
of malpractice pressure (P ), which is common knowledge. Assume that g(ti , P )
has the form:

g (ti , P ) = ρ(ti ) · P
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This form assumes that physicians understand the effects of their treatment decisions on the likelihood of an adverse outcome. However, both the
probability of an accompanying malpractice claim, as well as the expected
cost of the claim outcome, enter the problem through the parameter P , which
is unchanging in the amount of treatment provided. While it is likely that
these probabilities and costs would change with the amount of treatment, the
relative infrequency of malpractice claims makes it unlikely that physicians
completely understand these effects and incorporate them into their decisions.
Published statistics and word of mouth are a more likely source of information allowing physicians to form expectations of the prevailing frequency of
malpractice claims and the resulting costs, and both are independent of the
amount of treatment provided by an individual physician.
Each physician chooses the size of his patient roll (n) and the amount of
treatment to provide to each patient (ti ) as a share of available resources (s).
Due to the convexity of ρ(ti ), expected liability costs are at their lowest for any
number of patients when all patients receive an equal amount of treatment.
This means that ti =

s
n

for all i in equilibrium. Given values of w and s, each

physician solves the problem:


max
n≥0

wn − n · g

s
n

,P
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Let

 s 
n = n (w, s, P ) ∈arg max wn − n · g , P
n
n≥0


q
ñ = ñ(w, s, P ) = min n? ,
D
?

?

n? (w, s, P ) is the number of patients the physician would like to treat given
any contract {w, s} and level of malpractice pressure P . Since the expected
number of ill consumers is q, the maximum number of patients any of the D
identically-behaving physicians could treat is

q
.
D

Therefore, the number of pa-

tients the physician would actually treat given any {w, s} and P is ñ(w, s, P ).
The physician’s total liability costs are a convex function in n, so n? and ñ are
unique.
The final decision maker is a managed care organization (MCO). Consistent
with the margins of physician behaviour of interest here, the assumption of
a single firm avoids issues of physician mobility between competing MCOs.
This firm offers consumers a health insurance policy delivering a probability
of recovery equal to Q (hereafter referred to as “quality”) at a policy price of τ .
Recovery is the result of two events. First, the consumer must obtain a place
on a physician’s patient roll. In the absence of a complicated matching process
or search frictions, pairings occur with probability equal to the total number
of places available (Dn) divided by the total number of ill consumers seeking
placement (q). As long as the former is not greater than the latter, this is a
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probability serving as the level of “access” in the health care system. Second,
conditional on success with the first event, the patient receives treatment and
recovers with probability 1 − ρ(t). Quality, Q(n, t) =

Dn
(1
q

− ρ(t)), is thus the

product of these two probabilities.
It is assumed that the MCO and physicians cannot contract directly on either n or t. Such a contract would amount to both a quota and state contingency, both of which are made prohibitively difficult in the real world by the the
vast heterogeneity across patients, illnesses, and treatment options. Instead,
actual contracts require physicians to exercise professional judgement in determining whether and what kind of treatment is required. Despite the lack of
heterogeneity in this model, the noncontractibility assumption is intended to
preserve this aspect of real-world medical care.
A perfectly competitive market for health insurance (also assumed in Arlen
& MacLeod 2005) determines the objective of the MCO, as well as its constraints. The MCO must offer an insurance policy that maximizes expected
consumer utility subject to a zero profit constraint. Any other bundle, whether
one that brought non-zero profits to the MCO or one delivering a lower EU to
consumers without violating the zero profit constraint, would induce firm entry or exit and thus cannot hold in equilibrium. In order to be credible, the
quality of the insurance policy must be incentive compatible with physicians’
behaviour under the MCO’s contract {w, s}, meaning n = ñ in the insurer’s
problem. The firm acquires resources at a marginal cost of c, which is assumed
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to be constant. The MCO’s problem is thus:

max
w,s,τ





EU Q̃, τ = prob (H1 ) · U (H1 , m − τ ) + prob (H2 ) · U (H2 , m − τ )

subject

where

to

τ = Dwñ + Dcs

prob (H1 ) = (1 − q) + q Q̃
prob (H2 ) = q − q Q̃
 s i
 s  Dñ h
=
1− ρ
Q̃ = Q ñ,
ñ
q
ñ

Notice that, since the insurer’s choice set contains {w, s, τ } = {0, 0, 0}, a policy { Q̃, τ } = {0, 0} can always be delivered that is equivalent to no insurance.
Thus, the solution to the MCO’s problem will always be such that consumers
weakly prefer purchasing health insurance over going uninsured. Also note
that the redistributive aspect of medical malpractice is ignored, since none of
the physician’s liability costs appear as increased consumption for those patients suffering adverse outcomes. This potential benefit of the malpractice
system is not modelled due to the high loading charge of malpractice disputes
as a method of social insurance (Danzon 2001), although other models have
accounted for it (Gal-Or 1999).
This environment can be analyzed in the form of a decision problem from
the perspective of the MCO. The firm maximizes expected consumer utility by
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offering consumers a health insurance policy at a certain price and of a certain quality. In order to obtain such quality, the MCO must set a contract
to procure physicians’ services, while also accounting for how the structure of
that contract affects physicians’ treatment decisions. Given any set of parameters {q, m, D, c, H1 , H2 , P }, the solution to this problem is defined as a contract
between the MCO and consumers {τ ? }, a contract between the MCO and physicians {w? , s? }, and a choice of patient roll size given any contract with the MCO
{n? (w, s, P )} such that:


 s 
1. n (w, s, P ) = arg max wn − n · g , P
n
n≥0




? ?
?
2. {w , s , τ } ∈arg max EU Q̃, τ
τ = Dwñ + Dcs
?

w,s,τ


where ñ? = min n? (w? , s? , P ), Dq

is the number of patients each physician
? 
?
? 
treats in equilibrium. Also, let t? = ñs ? and Q̃? = Dñ
1 − ρ ñs ? be equilibrium
q
values of treatment and system quality respectively.

2.5

Equilibrium: Physician

As this paper is focused on the changes in equilibrium outcomes induced by
changes in malpractice pressure (P ), the effects of changes in the parameters
q, m, D, c, H1 , and H2 are not investigated here, and are largely suppressed in
the notation.
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Solving backward, the first problem to be considered is the physician’s. The
solution to the physician’s problem (n? ) is the n satisfying:

s s s
w
=ρ
−
· ρ0
P
n
n
n

where ρ0 (.) is the function’s first derivative. Due to the properties of ρ(t)
there will be a unique, non-negative, and finite n? as long as 0 ≤ w < P . Also,
since

s
n

= t and n only enters the right side through t, the physician’s problem

also characterizes a unique and non-negative level of treatment t(w, P ) =

s
n?

that is independent of s and determined entirely by w and P . The characterization of n? yields the physician’s responses to changes in the contract with the
MCO and the level of malpractice pressure:

 w   n3    ∂ 2 ρ −1
∂n?
=−
P·
∂P
P
s2
∂t2
 w   n    ∂ 2 ρ −1
∂t
=
P·
∂P
P
s
∂t2




−1
∂n?
n3
∂ 2ρ
P·
=
∂w
s2
∂t2


−1
n
∂t
∂ 2ρ
=−
P·
∂w
s
∂t2
∂n?  n 
=
∂s
s

<0,
>0,
>0,
<0,
>0
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These relationships together illustrate two points about physician behaviour
under this model. First, physicians practice both positive and negative defensive medicine in the face of rising malpractice pressure. Given any contract
with the MCO, rising pressure makes the marginal patient too risky to treat,
causing the physician to remove some patients from his patient roll (negative)
and also to increase the amount of treatment provided to each of the remaining
patients (positive). Second, physicians respond to financial incentives in their
contract with the MCO. A greater stock of resources lowers the risk of treating the marginal patient, and induces the physician to increase his patient roll
size. Increases in compensation-per-patient increase the revenue from treating
the marginal patient, leading the physician to take on more patients and accept greater expected liability costs. This behaviour is accounted for when the
MCO chooses its contracts.

2.6

Equilibrium: MCO

From the physician’s problem, for a given value of P , the revenue per patient
necessary for the MCO to induce a physician to choose to treat a given roll
size (n̄), as a function of resources, is given by ω(s; n̄, P ). Characteristics of this
function are retrieved from the physician’s problem:
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∂ρ
∂t



>0
ω(s; n̄, P ) = P ρ(t) − t
 2  
∂ω
∂ ρ
1
= − Pt
<0
2
∂s
∂t
n̄
 2
 3   2
∂ 2ω
1
∂ ρ
∂ ρ
=
−
P
+
t
∂s2
∂t2
∂t3
n̄

s
.
n̄

The function ω(.) is always decreasing in s and must have
 2 
 3 
at least one inflection point. This is because ∂∂t2ρ
> 0 and t ∂∂t3ρ
= 0,
Where t =

s=0

s=0

causing ω(.) to be concave at s = 0. It must eventually become and remain
convex, however, since ω(.) is always decreasing in s but must remain positive.
The existence of an inflection point is counter-intuitive, as the convexity
in ρ(t) implies that there are diminishing returns to treatment. That being
the case, one might expect the impact of a marginal increase in the stock of
resources available to physicians on ω(.) to decrease monotonically as more resources are provided. The reason for the existence of the inflection point is
that ω(.) approaches P as s approaches zero. From the solution to the physician’s problem, if w = P , the physician would want to see an infinite number of
patients since the large payment would fully compensate for the liability cost
of taking on a new patient, even as the probability of an adverse outcome approaches 1. In such a situation, small changes in w produce large changes in n,
and so maintaining n̄ requires only small changes in ω(.) at levels of s close to
0. An inflection point in ω(.) should therefore be expected at low levels of s, and
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thus t, when ω(.) is nearly as large as P . Without reason to expect more than
one, Assumption 1 is made to rule out cases of multiple unconnected inflection
points:

Assumption 1: The function ρ(t) is such that ∃! t > 0 where:

 3  (
≥ 0 ∀ t ∈[0, t] ;
∂ 2ρ
∂ ρ
+t
2
3
∂t
∂t
< 0 otherwise.

Let θ(s; n̄, c, P ) = Dω(s; n̄, P )n̄ + Dcs. The function θ(.) represents the minimum policy price that the insurer can charge in order to induce a representative physician to treat n̄ patients, given that the physician is provided with s
resources. As resources are removed, the total cost of inducing each physician
to keep treating n̄ patients approaches Dn̄P . This cost would be high in environments where malpractice pressure is high. In such instances, it is entirely
likely that the policy price necessary to get n̄ patients treated would be lower
when physicians are provided with a positive amount of resources than when
they are provided with no resources at all. For this to be case, treatment must
be effective at lowering the probability of an adverse outcome, and the marginal
cost of resources (c) must be low relative to the prevailing level of malpractice
pressure. It is to restrict the analysis to these cases that Assumption 2 is made:
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Assumption 2: The function ρ(t) and parameters {c, P } are such that:

∃ t̄ > 0 where ct̄ = P [1 − ρ(t̄) + t̄ρ0 (t̄)]

Notice that the right side of the equation is actually ω(0; n̄, P ) −
where

s̄
n̄

ω(s̄; n̄, P )

= t̄. Intuitively, for some level of treatment t̄, the cost of providing a

patient with that treatment (ct̄) is balanced by the reduction in the payment to
a physician (ω(0; n̄, P ) − ω(s̄; n̄, P )) that is required to get the physician to see
that patient when the physician is provided with s̄ = n̄t̄ in resources instead of
zero. Essentially, it means that the least expensive way to get doctors to treat
n̄ patients is not to provide them with zero resources for use in treatment.

Lemma 1: If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then in any equilibrium, t? must
be such that:

 3 
∂ 2ρ
∂ ρ
+t
<0
2
∂t
∂t3

Proof: Where Assumption 1 holds, the function ω(.) consists of a weakly
concave segment followed by a strictly convex segment, as shown in Figure 2.1.
The function θ(.) can be derived by scaling ω(.) by Dn̄ and shifting it up by a
vertical distance of Dcs, as shown in Figure 2.2. The condition determining the

31

Figure 2.1:

The revenue-per-patient necessary to induce a physician to treat n̄ patients, as a function of resources
provided. By Assumption 1, it consists of a weakly concave segment followed by a strictly convex one.

Figure 2.2: The amount of spending per patient necessary to induce physicians to treat n̄ patients, as a function
of resources provided. By Assumption 2, the global minimum cannot occur at s = 0.
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concavity of θ(.) is identical to that of ω(.), and so θ(.) also consists of a weakly
concave segment followed by a strictly convex segment. Where Assumption 2
holds, θ(.) has an interior global minimum. Also note that this global minimum
must be in the segment where ω(.) and θ(.) are convex. Any amount of resources
in the domain of the concave segment (s) is dominated by another amount of
resources (s̄), just as θ(s) = θ(s̄) = τ̄ in Figure 2.2. This is because the two
points induce the same patient roll size and entail the same policy price, but
the greater amount of resources results in more treatment and higher quality
at s̄. Thus any equilibrium must be in the convex segment of θ(.), where
 3 
t ∂∂t3ρ < 0.

∂2ρ
∂t2

+

Solving the MCO’s problem requires working with the function ñ(w, s, P ).
However, this function is not well-behaved, so the insurer’s problem is modified
using the function n? (w, s, P ) instead. This change requires the subsequent
step of verifying whether or not the solution to the MCO’s modified problem is
feasible (ie. satisfies n? (w, s, P ) = ñ) and if not, the optimal way for the MCO
to restructure its contracts. As shown in the proof of Proposition 2.1, it turns
out that the optimal restructured contract is such that n? = ñ =

q
,
D

and the

solution to the insurer’s problem can be determined in this case as well. It is
convenient to define equilibria in terms of whether or not a restructuring is
necessary, so let:
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s
ŵ(τ, P ), ŝ(τ, P ) = arg max Q ñ,
ñ
w,s


q
τ̄ (P ) = min τ
ñ (ŵ, ŝ, P ) =
D


τ ≥ Dwñ + Dcs

The insurance policy price τ̄ (P ) represents the lowest price which, if allocated optimally between physician payments and resources, would be sufficient
to provide access for the expected number of ill policyholders, given the level
of malpractice pressure. Define a “full-access equilibrium” as any equilibrium
{τ ? , w? , s? , n? (w, s, P )} such that ñ? =

q
D

and τ ? > τ̄ (P ). Also define a “limited-

access equilibrium” as any equilibrium such that τ ? ≤ τ̄ (P ). The first order
conditions in the MCO’s modified problem are:

∂Q?
= W M Uy ·
∂w
∂Q?
q · ∆U ·
= W M Uy ·
∂s

q · ∆U ·

∂τ
∂w
∂τ
∂s

(2.1)
(2.2)

τ = Dwn? + Dcs

where,

∆U = U (H1 , m − τ ) − U (H2 , m − τ ) > 0,
W M Uy = (1 − q) ·

∂U (H1 , y)
∂U (H2 , y)
∂∆U
+q·
+ qQ? ·
>0
∂y
∂y
∂y

and
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The term W M Uy stands for “weighted marginal utility of consumption”, and
represents the marginal value of a unit of consumption that a policyholder
faces ex ante. The ∆U term represents difference in utility enjoyed by those
who recover from the low health status to the high, or the value of recovery.

Proposition 2.1: If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then there exists a unique
solution to the MCO’s problem that is either a full-access or a limited-access
equilibrium.
Proof: In appendix.

Part of the insurer’s problem is to decide, given some level of malpractice
pressure, how to divide up its revenues from selling insurance policies (τ ) in
order to procure inputs (t and n) to maximize health care quality (Q). This
problem is shown in Figure 2.3. The proof to Proposition 2.1 shows that there
is a unique level of treatment t? (P ) that solves the insurer’s modified problem,
and that this level of treatment is independent of the amount of funds that
the insurer has available for procurement. This means that, if the insurer
were to charge higher policy prices, the optimal way to use the higher revenues
would be to hold the level of treatment constant at t? and use the additional
funds to induce physicians to treat more patients. Therefore, as τ increases,
the expansion path is initially vertical in {t, n} space.
This is true until τ = τ̄ (P ), represented by its isocost line in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3:

Expansion path showing the optimal allocation of insurer revenues in procuring health care inputs t
and n as health insurance policies become more expensive.
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The expansion path cannot continue along the vertical path from the modified
problem, because the values of n in these allocations would be greater than
q
,
D

and thus infeasible. In such a case, the insurer would need to choose the

best alternative contract that brings about a feasible n. Since there is a unique
solution to the insurer’s first-order conditions, n? >
n=

q
D

dominates all n <

such that n =

q
.
D

q
,
D

q
D

implies that the choice

and so the alternative contract must be structured

Thus, if τ increases beyond τ̄ (P ), the additional funds are

used to increase t instead of n. This gives rise to the horizontal section of the
expansion path in Figure 2.3. Any value of τ results in an allocation somewhere
along this expansion path, and so the unique equilibrium value must fall in
either the full- or limited-access segments.

2.7

Full-Access Equilibrium

By definition, every ill policyholder receives treatment in a full-access equilibrium, so it must be that ñ =

q
.
D

Analysis can therefore be confined to the values

of w and s that induce a choice of n? (w, s, P ) ≥
Since any w and s such that n? (w, s, P ) >

q
D

q
D

in the physician’s problem.

would result in

∂ Q̃
∂w

= 0 and

∂τ
∂w

> 0,

which would violate (2.1), analysis can further be confined to those w and s in
ducing n? (w, s, P ) = Dq . From the previous section, w = ω s; Dq , P is the unique
value of w that would bring about such a choice for any value of s. Substituting

w = ω s; Dq , P , ñ = Dq , and t = Ds
into the MCO’s problem and maximizing
q
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with respect to s yields the first order conditions:



 2 

∂ ρ
∂ρ
= W M Uy · c − P t
∆U · −
∂t
∂t2
 q

τ = q · ω s; , P + Dcs
D

Proposition 2.2: If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then

∂τ ?
∂P

(2.3)

> 0, and

∂ ñ?
∂P

= 0 in

any full-access equilibrium.
Proof: In appendix.

This proposition states that, starting in any full-access equilibrium, the
MCO would respond to rising malpractice pressure by increasing prices in order to maintain the level of access to physicians enjoyed by their customers.
Since the set of consumers is of measure 1, and all consumers purchase health
insurance in equilibrium, the policy price is equal to total health care spending.
Therefore, total health care spending is also increasing in malpractice pressure
in any full-access equilibrium.
The intuition for these comparative statics can be found in Figure 2.4. The
marginal benefit to consumers of an increase in the policy price (and thus
increased funds for the procurement of resources and physicians’ services) is
M B = q · ∆U ∂∂τQ̃ , which represents the value of a marginally higher probability
of ending up with H1 instead of H2 . M B is monotonically decreasing in τ for
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Figure 2.4:

The effect of an increase in malpractice pressure on equilibrium health care spending in a full-access

equilibrium.

all τ > τ̄ (P ). The marginal cost is M C = W M Uy , which is increasing in τ and
represents the marginal value of forgone consumption.
An increase in P has three effects. First, given any amount of resources, the
higher P means the MCO must provide physicians with a greater w in order
to maintain n? =

q
.
D

At a given level of spending, this leaves less funds for the

procurement of resources, causing ill consumers to receive less treatment and
enjoy a lower-quality insurance policy. This increases the likelihood that the
patient ends up with the lower health status instead of the higher. Since the
marginal utility of consumption is lower for consumers enjoying H2 instead of
H1 , a higher P causes consumption to be marginally less valuable ex ante to
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consumers. This results in the downward shift in M C at every τ . Second, since
there are diminishing returns to treatment, the lower level of treatment means
that a marginal increase in spending (and thus resources) delivers a greater
marginal increase in quality. Finally, an increase in P causes the shadow price


2
of resources c − P t ∂∂t2ρ to decrease at every τ . The second term in the shadow

price, the amount by which the MCO can reduce ω s, Dq , P as it increases resources, becomes greater at a lower t and higher P . The second and third terms
create a bigger “bang for the buck” from increasing spending on resources, and
thus an increase in P causes M B to shift up at every τ . Taken together, these
effects cause the new equilibrium to occur at an unambiguously higher level
of spending. Since spending in the initial full-access equilibrium is greater
than τ̄ (P ), full access is preserved in the new equilibrium with the marginally
higher P .

Proposition 2.3: If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then

∂t?
∂P

> 0 and

∂ Q̃?
∂P

> 0 in

a full-access equilibrium if and only if J,w < 1, where x,y is the percent change
in x due to a one-percent change in y and J =

W M Uy
.
∆U

Proof: In appendix.

Proposition 2.3 describes the impact of increasing malpractice pressure on
health care quality in a full-access equilibrium. From Proposition 2.2, the MCO
raises the the policy price in response to a marginal increase in malpractice
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pressure in any full-access equilibrium. Since all consumers purchase health
insurance in equilibrium, and the MCO makes zero profits, the entire increase
in revenues must be divided between increased per-patient payments and resources in the new equilibrium contract between the MCO and physicians. The
condition in Proposition 2.3 is necessary and sufficient to determine whether
or not the new equilibrium contract provides physicians with more resources
than were available under the old contract. Also from Proposition 2.2, the number of patients that each physician would treat in equilibrium would remain
unchanged. Therefore, the new equilibrium contract would allow physicians to
divide a greater amount of resources among the same number of patients, leading to a greater amount of treatment, a lower chance of an adverse outcome,
and greater health care quality.
There is reason to expect that J,w < 1 in all full-access equilibria with
reasonable parameter values and functional forms. Intuitively, the condition
states that policy price increase necessary to raise physicians’ revenues by one
percent would result in less than a one percent change in the expected value of
consumption (W M Uy ) relative to recovery (∆U ). As long as the share of income
devoted to health insurance is relatively low and the value of recovery is high,
small percentage changes in the prices of health care inputs would produce
even smaller changes in a consumer’s expected value of consumption relative
to recovery. Given that the United States, the highest spender on health care
both per-capita and as a percentage of GDP, spends less than 20% of GDP on
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health care, the amount of spending necessary to violate the condition seems
unrealistic, particularly since cheaper limited-access insurance policies could
be provided if consumers so prefer. Taking Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 together,
jurisdictions or medical specialties in full-access equilibria can expect rising
malpractice pressure to cause increases in the cost of health insurance and
total health care spending. Regarding quality, equilibrium health care quality
would increase with malpractice pressure as long as the level of health care
spending is not extremely high.

2.8

Limited-Access Equilibrium

An important finding in the proof of Proposition 2.1 is that the treatment t
solving the modified insurer’s problem is independent of the level of spending,
as shown for t? (P ) in Figure 2.3. Since, for a given P , the level of treatment
is uniquely determined in the physician’s problem by w, then w? (P ) such that
t(w? (P ), P ) = t? (P ) is also independent of τ . Since modified and unmodified
solutions are equivalent in limited-access equilibria, both t? (P ) and w? (P ) from
the physician’s modified problem arise in a limited-access equilibrium for a
given level of P .

Proposition 2.4: If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then
access equilibrium.

∂t?
∂P

> 0 in any limited-
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Proof: In appendix.

Since limited-access equilibria are interior solutions, the cost-effectiveness
of a marginal unit of access and a marginal unit of treatment are the same in
equilibrium. The intuition behind Proposition 2.4 is that malpractice pressure
makes access more expensive relative to treatment, creating a substitution effect away from access toward treatment. Furthermore, since (1 − ρ) is solely
a function of t, then the equilibrium probability of patient recovering from illness, conditional on gaining access to a physician, would increase in P as well.

Proposition 2.5: If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then

∂τ ?
∂P

< 0 in a limited-

access equilibrium if and only if:

τ<

∆U
∂∆U
∂y

(2.4)

Proof: In appendix.

Since ∆U is concave in y, a level of health care spending greater than 50%
of consumer income would be required to violate Condition (2.4). For this reason, and similarly to Proposition 2.3, Condition (2.4) can be expected to hold
for all realistic parameter values. The reason that a qualifying condition is
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Figure 2.5:

The effect of an increase in malpractice pressure on equilibrium health care spending in a limitedaccess equilibrium satisfying (2.4).
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required here is that increases in malpractice pressure have different implications for the marginal benefit and cost of health care spending in the two
types of equilibrium. In comparing Figures 2.4 and 2.5, a rise in malpractice
pressure has the same qualitative effect on M C in the two equilibrium types,
but the opposite effect on M B. This is because marginal spending increases
in the limited-access case are optimally devoted to procuring greater access
instead of treatment. An increase in malpractice pressure makes it more expensive for the MCO to induce physicians to treat a given number of patients,
which makes access more expensive. This increase in the marginal cost of access means that a marginal increase in spending is able to provide a relatively
smaller increase in quality at the higher level of malpractice pressure. Essentially, unlike the full-access case, malpractice pressure lowers the “bang for the
buck” from health care spending, and thus creates the downward shift in M B.
Where (2.4) holds, the shift in M B dominates the shift in M C, leading to a
lower equilibrium policy price.

Corollary 2.5a: In any limited-access equilibrium,
∂ Q̃?
∂P

∂τ ?
∂P

<0⇒

∂ ñ?
∂P

< 0 and

< 0.
Corollary 2.5b: If (2.4) holds in a limited-access equilibrium at P 0 then it

holds for all P ∈(P 0 , ∞ ).

The implication in Corollary 2.5a fairly straightforward. Once {w, t} =
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{w? , t? }, the only endogenous variable left to affect health care quality Q̃ is
τ . Holding other parameters constant,

∂ Q̃?
∂P

=

∂ Q̃ ∂τ ?
∂τ ∂P

+

∂ Q̃
?.
∂P τ

Since quality is

increasing in spending for a given level of malpractice pressure, and decreasing in malpractice pressure for a given level of spending,

∂τ ?
∂P

< 0 makes the

right side unambiguously negative. Essentially, rising malpractice pressure
makes quality more expensive to provide, so if the funds available for spending
on quality decrease then the amount of quality produced must also decrease.
Since t? increases with P by Proposition 2.4, the only way that Q̃? can decrease
in P is if ñ? is also decreasing in equilibrium.
If spending is decreasing in malpractice pressure, then an increase in P
causes the left side of (2.4) to decrease and the right side to increase, proving
Corollary 2.5b. Taken together, the propositions and corollaries in this section
imply there is a threshold level of malpractice pressure, after which any further
increases in malpractice pressure would cause decreases in health care spending. Since ñ? decreases in P in limited-access equilibria, this further implies
that any full-access equilibria must occur before this threshold, at lower levels
of malpractice pressure. Also, despite each patient receiving better treatment,
the reduction in ill consumers’ access to medical care causes the overall quality
of the health care system to decrease in limited-access equilibria.
Notice in Table 2.1 that the effects of malpractice pressure on spending and
quality in the limited-access equilibrium are the opposite of those in the fullaccess equilibrium. Intuitively, there are two inputs into the quality of health
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Where it occurs
Effect on access

∂ ñ?


∂t?

Low P

High P

∂τ ?



∂P


∂ Q̃?
∂P

−

+

∂P

Effect on system quality

Limited-Access Eqbm

0

∂P

Effect on treatment
Effect on spending



Full-Access Eqbm



+

+

−

+

−

Table 2.1: Summary of analytical results

insurance: access and treatment. Where malpractice pressure is low, physicians do not require much incentive to treat a large number of patients. When
physicians are so amenable to treating patients, access is cheap relative to
treatment, making it optimal to provide as much access as possible. There is
an upper bound on the amount of access consumers can be provided, that being
“full access”. While full access is not costly at low levels of malpractice pressure, it becomes more costly as pressure increases. Therefore, at low levels
of malpractice pressure, the price of insurance and total health care spending
are increasing in pressure in order to maintain full access. Under the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 2.3, it is optimal to use enough of
the increased revenue from higher policy prices to procure more resources for
the physicians than they previously had, which causes quality to increase in
malpractice pressure as well.
As the cost of full access increases, eventually consumers’ willingness to
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pay becomes exhausted. Rather than continue to maintain full-access, the
MCO instead offers a lower-priced insurance policy with more limited access
to physicians. Should malpractice pressure continue to increase, each level
of access becomes more costly. Since the marginal cost of resources remains
constant, the MCO substitutes away from access toward treatment in the production of health care quality, causing access to decrease and treatment to increase in malpractice pressure. Finally, since there are decreasing returns to
treatment, this substitution makes each dollar spent on health insurance less
effective at producing quality. Therefore, consumers would prefer to substitute
away from spending on health insurance and instead retain more income for
consumption. These two substitution effects cause both spending and quality to decrease in malpractice pressure once pressure is high enough to make
limited access preferable to full access. Altogether, given the different comparative statics in the two types of equilibrium, and the values of malpractice
pressure for which we can expect each type of equilibrium to occur, the model
predicts non-monotonic relationships between malpractice pressure and both
health care quality and expenditure.

2.9

Discussion

A numerical example provides a useful illustration of the analytical predictions from Table 2.1. A Cobb-Douglas utility function and the functional form
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Figure 2.6:

Numerical example illustrating non-monotonic relationships between malpractice pressure and 1)
the level of access, 2) the price of health insurance, and 3) the quality of the health care system.

ρ(t) =

1
1+αt

where α > 0 produce the relationships in Figure 2.6. The non-

monotonicities predicted by the model are clearly apparent. These predictions
offer an explanation for the discrepancies in the empirical literature. The first
two effects in Table 2.1 confirm the beliefs in the medical establishment on
the effect of liability costs on defensive practices. Any effect that malpractice
pressure has on access to care would be negative. In equilibrium, on average, physicians’ practices would thus become more restrictive to patients as
malpractice pressure increases. Regardless of equilibrium type, the amount of
resources used in the treatment of each patient is increasing in liability costs.
Due to the diminishing returns from treatment and the constant marginal cost
of resources, these additional treatments decline in cost-effectiveness, and may
thus be interpreted as medically unnecessary or wasteful.
Despite consistent effects of malpractice pressure on defensive medicine in
equilibrium, the links between defensive practices and the cost and quality of
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care are more complicated than those espoused by the American Medical Association. Due to the non-monotonicity, regression analysis designed to uncover
the monotonic relationship best approximating a set of observations would report coefficients biased by the sample’s prevailing equilibrium type. Studies
utilizing data predominantly to the left of the threshold would report positive
coefficients while those from the right would report negative ones. Samples
with observations from both sides of the threshold would report coefficients biased toward zero. In this way, even the widespread and consistent practice of
defensive medicine could be hidden by inconsistent and seemingly conflicting
empirical investigations into its effects on health care cost and quality.
The monotonic relationships found (or not found) in past empirical studies
are consistent with the non-monotonic relationships predicted by the model
presented here. Diagnostic and medical imaging procedures are useful examples of treatment intensity as defined here, and they tend to be positively affected by malpractice pressure (Kessler & McClellan 2002, Baicker at al 2007),
as is predicted by the model. Regarding access, the incidence of late onset of
prenatal care in a population from Dubay et al (2001) is a useful measure of
the percentage of a sample in limited-access equilibrium. In regressing the
late initiation of prenatal care on malpractice premiums, they find statistically
significant negative effects that, while relatively small, were approximately
twelve times greater in magnitude for unmarried black mothers with less than
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high-school education than for white married mothers with a college education. In the former, 51.2% of mothers received late care versus 5.3% in the
latter. These results could be capturing the relationship from the first diagram
in Figure 2.6. The greater is the share of observations from the right side of
the threshold, the more negative would be the coefficient reported by standard
regression analysis. The model’s predictions also match evidence from General
Accounting Office (2003), which found effects on access were greater in rural
populations than urban populations. Lower average incomes in rural populations could result in less of a willingness and ability to maintain full access, and
thus a switch to limited-access equilibria at a lower threshold of malpractice
pressure than would be observed in urban populations.
The studies that uncover no statistically or economically significant effects
of malpractice pressure on the cost or quality of health care tend to be broad
studies at the state-level, such as Baicker & Chandra (2005), Hellinger & Encinosa (2006), Congressional Budget Office (2006), and Baicker et al (2007).
Broad data is more likely to incorporate observations from both types of equilibria, and the underlying monotonicity would bias their estimated coefficients
toward zero. Studies focussed on a more narrowly defined populations exhibit
a link between the prevailing liability risk of that population and the sign of
the revealed coefficients, a pattern corresponding to the model’s predictions.
Kessler & McClellan (1996) and (2002) examine spending in data covering
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heart-attack and heart disease patients on Medicare. Elderly patients are relatively unlikely sources of malpractice lawsuits (Kessler & McClellan 1996,
Sloan & Shadle 2009) due to the lower lost wages and shorter pain and suffering horizons they could claim (Avraham & Shanzenbach 2010). Furthermore,
cardiovascular physicians enjoy a percentage of claims that result in payment
that is slightly under two thirds of the average (Dove et al 2010), and the specialty is not considered high-risk by the American Medical Association (Cotet
2012). Lakdawalla & Seabury (2009) also utilize data on elderly Medicare patients, and further draw many of their observations from California, which has
experienced some of the lowest malpractice insurance rate increases (General
Accounting Office 2003). Furthermore, the state’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of 1975 is credited by the medical industry with lowering the cost of health insurance, stemming the outflow of physicians, and
improving patient access to care (Brenner & Smith 2004, Lumalcuri & Hale
2010). It seems plausible, therefore, that physicians serving the populations
studied in the works of Kessler & McClellan and Lakdawalla & Seabury practice under relatively low malpractice risk, and both find the positive relationships that the model predicts would be associated with populations on the left
side of the threshold.
On the other hand, the studies reporting negative relationships use data on
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infant health and obstetric care, which is one of the riskiest medical specialties for the frequency and severity of malpractice lawsuits. The cost of malpractice insurance for obstetricians increased 180 percent between 1977 and
1984, versus 109 percent for lower risk specialties (Danzon et al 1990) while
growth rates in the 1990s and early 2000s have been erratic (Reyes 2010). Obstetricians face a high variance in malpractice payments (Kravitz et al 1991),
the highest payment rate conditional on a claim, and the greatest likelihood
that payments will exceed the limits of malpractice insurance coverage (Jena
et al 2011). If liability risk is great enough to push certain groups of mothers
into limited-access equilibria, then negative relationships between malpractice
pressure and the cost and quality of care would be expected. This was the case
regarding quality in Dubay et al (2001), since newborns’ health indicators were
unaffected while mothers’ access suffered.
The use of cesarean section in childbirth as a measure for spending or defensive behaviour is challenging because it doesn’t easily map into either treatment or access as modelled here. It is similar to treatment intensity since it
requires more resources per patient to conduct each birth, but to access as well
in that it cannot be conducted more than once per birth. This is problematic as
the model predicts that the use of cesarean section should increase with malpractice pressure in its role as treatment intensity, but decrease in its role as
access. Perhaps reflecting this, as well as the variation in patients’ distribution across full- and limited-access equilibria derived from Dubay et al (2001),
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empirical studies examining the use of cesarean section have uncovered mixed
effects. Currie & MacLeod (2008) stands out in finding that liability-reducing
reforms increase the incidence of cesarean section. While this paper’s predictions are consistent with their empirical findings if much of their population
is in limited-access equilibrium, the model presented here provides an alternative intuition for the result. They propose that reductions in the fear of liability
induce physicians to perform more expensive cesarean sections in order to pull
in higher fees. While this incentive to gain revenue surely exists, it is unlikely to be held in check by the fear of liability. Many more obstetrical claims
(31% vs 3%) are associated with nonperformance or delay in performing a cesarean section than the unnecessary performance of one (Kravitz et al 1991)
and there is some evidence that cesarean section is not susceptible to supplierinduced demand (Tussing & Wojtowycz 1992). This model alternatively suggests that reductions in malpractice pressure make health insurance policies
with greater access to cesarean section more affordable, thus increasing the
incidence. Determining which mechanism is behind the negative relationship
would be worthwhile.

2.10

Summary and Implications

Medical malpractice reform has been proposed as a policy option for reducing health care spending and improving health care quality. This is due to
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consistent responses in surveys of physicians the malpractice liability costs encourage the practice of defensive medicine. Discrepancies between these surveys and the lack of consistent findings from the empirical literature have confounded efforts to determine whether tort reforms produce the desired effects.
This presents a model of the interactions between patients, physicians, and
health insurers that provides an explanation for these discrepancies. It implies
that conflicting findings in the empirical literature are due to the existence of
two equilibrium types that exhibit the opposite effects of malpractice pressure
on health care spending and quality. These opposite effects, plus the switching
of equilibrium types one a threshold of malpractice pressure is reached, create
non-monotonic relationships between health care spending and quality, despite
the practice of defensive medicine at all levels of pressure.
Any normative implications that should be taken away from this model are
limited. By ignoring the compensation of injured patients, and the identical
treatment of each patient in equilibrium, the model assumes away potential
benefits of medical malpractice law. This produces the fragile implication that
malpractice pressure should be reduced to zero. This implication arises, however, due to assumptions made for tractability rather than realism. The intuition behind the model’s positive findings, however, is robust to the assumptions that produce more persuasive normative implications found in the existing theoretical work on medical malpractice. Malpractice pressure makes access to health care more expensive relative to treatment. Consumers may have
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some willingness to bear the cost of maintaining full access to care as malpractice pressure rises, but this willingness to pay becomes exhausted if their
consumption falls to low. Thereafter, consumers may prefer less expensive insurance with some limits to access, such as congestion, in order to preserve
their consumption.
There are several implications of these findings for public policy. First, tort
reform is not a “silver bullet” policy capable of raising health care quality while
also lowering the cost of care for a given homogenous population. Even if a
given reform was successful in changing the prevailing level of malpractice
pressure, quality and spending would move together. Policymakers, therefore,
face a tradeoff and must decide whether quality improvements or cost reductions would be of greater benefit to the affected population. Second, sweeping
tort reforms would produce the opposite effects in distinct geographic regions,
medical specialties, and patient demographics according to the group’s dominant equilibrium type. This suggests that a targeted approach to tort reform
would produce consistent effects better than sweeping changes. Finally, the
results provide clues for developing alternative empirical model specifications
for investigating defensive medicine. Non-linear model specifications would
be useful in approximating the peaked relationships predicted here, notwithstanding certain concerns raised in the literature with some continuous measures of malpractice pressure (Kessler & McClellan 1996). In the case of statelevel tort reform, which indicates a change in malpractice pressure rather than
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a continuous measure of it, the model predicts that the qualitative effect is determined by the current level of access that a population of ill consumers enjoy
with their physicians. Excessive waiting times, a high incidence of late treatment, or other significant difficulty in securing a physician’s services can be
considered examples of poor access. Where these are at practically low levels, tort reforms lowering malpractice pressure should lower insurance policy prices and total health care expenditure, while causing some reductions in
health care quality. Where they are unnaturally high, the same reforms would
have the opposite effect. This particular role for access measures, that of distinguishing observations expected to experience different qualitative effects,
has not been investigated in the empirical literature thus far. Data linking
measures of access alongside measures of malpractice pressure, health care
spending, and quality would be required for such an investigation to occur.

2.11
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Chapter 3
Physician Mobility and the
Differential Effects of Defensive
Medicine

3.1

Introduction

Defensive medicine refers to the treatment decisions made by physicians primarily to avoid medical malpractice liability rather than benefit patients. Examples include the ordering of unnecessary and costly diagnostic procedures to
assure against any claims of negligence, or the avoidance of patients or procedures thought to be particularly at risk of resulting in a malpractice claim. Numerous surveys of physicians and the advocacy efforts of the American Medical
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Association report that defensive medicine is both widely practiced and a primary reason for the rising cost of consumer health insurance and/or restricted
access to care (Bovbjerg et al 1996, Studdert at al 2005, Dove et al 2010, Lumalcuri & Hale 2010, Reyes 2010, Sethi et al 2012). This has created advocacy for
legislated malpractice reforms, mostly at the state-level. Researchers, too, have
paid attention to the subject of defensive medicine. These empirical studies
most often involve investigations into a possible relationship between various
measures of medical malpractice liability costs, or “malpractice pressure”, and
health care spending and/or quality. The results of these studies have been
mixed, and have led some researchers to conclude that defensive medicine has
not played a policy-relevant role in rising US health care expenditure, and
that malpractice reform is thus unwarranted (Helland & Showalter 2009, Lakdawalla & Seabury 2009, Sloan & Shadle 2009, Avraham & Shanzenbach 2010,
Reyes 2010, Cotet 2012).
A significant share of the empirical investigations into defensive medicine
utilize data based on geographic jurisdictions, usually at the state or county
level (Baicker & Chandra 2005, Baicker et al 2007, Hellinger & Encinosa 2006,
Lakdawalla & Seabury 2009, Paik et al 2011). The goal is to determine whether
health care spending or quality is systematically different in jurisdictions with
high malpractice pressure. The empirical models used in these studies, however, assume that the malpractice pressure in a given state affects health care
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spending only within that state. This specification neglects any potential effects that malpractice pressure in one state may have on the cost or quality of
heath care in other states.
One channel through which these cross-jurisdictional effects might occur
is physician mobility. Both practicing physicians and newly graduated physicians have some discretion over the geographic region in which to locate their
practices. Given the survey results, it appears that malpractice insurance premiums and the prospect of a malpractice lawsuit are a source of concern for
physicians. For this reason, if all other considerations were equal, physicians
would prefer to locate in jurisdictions where they would face low malpractice
pressure. It then follows that rising malpractice pressure in one jurisdiction
could trigger physician relocation, and thus affect the cost or quality of health
care in other jurisdictions.
The potential reactions of health insurers to physician mobility makes the
ultimate effects on health care spending and quality ambiguous. If physicians
carry with them the skills, attention, and resources that are useful in the treatment of patients, then the quality of a health care system could increase with
the number of practicing physicians. If these physicians were to begin departing due to an increase in malpractice pressure, one possible response from insurers is to raise physicians’ compensation to offset the increased malpractice
liability costs and induce them to remain. An insurer could take this action a
step further by raising compensation enough to attract physicians from other

64

jurisdictions in order to spread the malpractice risk of treating the insurer’s
policyholders. This would leave insurers in other jurisdictions facing outflows
of physicians, and could induce them to take like action. In this way, rising
malpractice pressure in one jurisdiction could cause increases in health care
spending in multiple jurisdictions. On the other hand, if the initial insurer
chose not to raise physician compensation, the outflow could create more competition among physicians in other jurisdictions and thus lower the cost of care.
For these reasons, it is not obvious how mobile physicians’ reactions to changes
in malpractice pressure would affect health care spending and quality across
other jurisdictions in equilibrium.
The existence of cross-jurisdictional effects would introduce important considerations into the subject of defensive medicine. First, it would drive a wedge
between the direct, or jurisdictional, effects of rising malpractice pressure and
the aggregate effects. This is relevant to the idea of tort reform as a strategy
to decrease national health care spending, because estimating the direct effect of state reforms on state variables and extrapolating to the national level
would not capture the aggregate effect. Second, failing to account for crossjurisdictional effects could introduce bias into estimates of the direct effects of
changes in malpractice pressure. For example, if rising malpractice pressure in
jurisdiction i caused increases in health care spending in most other jurisdictions as well as i, the estimated effect on jurisdiction i would be biased toward
zero. Alternatively, if the effects were predominantly negative, the estimated
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effect would be positive and inflated.
One goal of this paper is to investigate whether physician mobility creates
cross-jurisdictional effects from rising malpractice pressure, and if so, what
kind of bias this would create in an empirical study that didn’t account for
physician mobility. This is done using a theoretical model of the interactions
between consumers, physicians, and health insurers. These decision makers
reside in one of two jurisdictions. It is assumed that consumers are immobile,
and must therefore make all of their decisions within their jurisdiction of origin. Through an assumption on the competitiveness of the health insurance
market described below, health insurers are also rendered effectively immobile. Physicians, on the other hand, are able to locate in either jurisdiction.
In equilibrium, therefore, physicians would only occupy a jurisdiction in which
they have a weak preference to practice.
While the most literal interpretation of these jurisdictions is a geographical
one, there is also a more abstract interpretation. They can represent mutually
exclusive specialties, subspecialties, or other “options” that a physician could
pursue. For example, a location decision for obstetrician/gynaecologists would
consist of whether to focus exclusively on obstetrics or gynaecology, or the share
of their practice to devote to one or the other. This allows the model to serve a
second function: determining whether and how changes in a common level of
malpractice pressure would differentially affect two distinct populations of consumers. This exercise sheds some light on the equity considerations of rising
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malpractice pressure.
To determine the qualitative effects on health care spending and quality,
the model is solved numerically for various cases of rising malpractice pressure. Cross-jurisdictional effects were confirmed in every specification of the
two-jurisdiction case investigated. Changes in one jurisdiction’s malpractice
pressure affected the other jurisdiction’s health care spending and quality, as
well as access to care. Based on the signs of these effects, results indicate
that cross-jurisdictional effects due to physician mobility in a k-jurisdiction
case would inflate estimates of the effect of malpractice pressure on measures
of health care system quality. On the other hand, the effects on health care
spending can be biased either toward or away from zero, depending on other
jurisdictions’ approach to competition for physicians. Finally, in investigating
the differential effects of defensive medicine, the model predicts that physicians would exit poorer jurisdictions for more wealthy ones. This matches some
existing empirical findings, which showed that physicians tend to depart rural
areas for urban areas as malpractice pressure rises (General Accounting Office
2003).

3.2

The Model

The model environment is made up of two jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction
i ∈ {1, 2} contains a population of identical consumers of measure 1, although
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consumers need not be identical across jurisdictions. Each consumer is endowed with income mi and is immobile, and thus confined to his jurisdiction
of origin. Similar to Chapter 2, a consumer’s preferences are represented by
the utility function Ui (y, H), where y is consumption and H is the consumer’s
health status. The utility function is continuous, differentiable, and strictly
concave. In the absence of health insurance, the health status of a consumer in
jurisdiction i is a binary random variable, taking the value Hi1 (healthy) with
probability 1 −

qi and Hi2 (ill) with probability qi . Before the value of a con-

sumer’s health status is revealed, he can purchase a health insurance policy
at a price of τi . Health insurance allows consumers who become ill to recover
their healthy status with probability Qi , which is labelled the “quality” of the
health insurance available to consumers in jurisdiction i. Therefore, the expected utility of an insured consumer in jurisdiction i is:

EUi = (1 − qi + qi Qi ) Ui (mi − τi , Hi1 ) + (qi − qi Qi ) Ui (mi − τi , Hi2 )

There is a continuum of physicians of measure D. Each physician is endowed with s rivalrous units of resources for use in the treatment of ill consumers, otherwise known as patients. Examples of these kinds of resources
include the physician’s time and attention. By expending resources t in the
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treatment of a given patient, a physician increases the probability that the patient recovers from 0 to 1 − ρi (t). The function ρi (t) can be considered the probability of an adverse outcome, where the patient remains in the poor health
status despite receiving treatment. It is assumed to be positive, decreasing in
t, and strictly convex, where ρi (0) = 1 and limt→∞ ρi (t) = 0. These assumptions
are designed to impose diminishing returns of physicians’ endowed resources
on the treatment of patients.
Each adverse outcome in jurisdiction i brings an uninsurable expected malpractice liability cost of Pi upon the treating physician. This parameter, which
serves as a measure of “malpractice pressure” in the model, is a composite of
several factors contributing to malpractice liability costs. These include the
likelihood that adverse outcome leads to a lawsuit, the reputational and psychic costs of participating in a trial, the prospect of malpractice awards exceeding the limits of malpractice insurance, etc. This means that the expected
liability cost from treating a patient in jurisdiction i with t units of resources is
ρi (t) · Pi .
Each physician j must choose the jurisdiction in which to locate her medical
practice (cj ∈ {1, 2}), and given such choice, must also choose the number of
cases to take on (ni ). Each patient actually treated in jurisdiction i brings in
a payment of wi . Also, since all consumers in a given jurisdiction are identical
and ρi (.) is convex and decreasing, then for any choice ni , total liability costs
will be minimized where each patient receives an equal amount of resources
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in their treatment. Therefore, given the choice to locate in jurisdiction i, each
physician’s profit-maximizing caseload size (n?i ) would solve:


max
ni ≥0


wi ni − ni · ρi

 
s
Pi
ni

In making a location decision, physicians’ payoffs are made up of two components. The first is the net returns from practicing medicine in jurisdiction
i, labelled πi . Let D1 and D2 be the measures of physicians practicing in jurisdictions 1 and 2 respectively. Since the total measure of ill consumers in
jurisdiction i is qi , the maximum number of patients that each physician could


qi
qi
actually treat is Di . Let ñi = min ni , Di be the actual number of patients
the physician treats. Therefore, net returns are total revenues (wi ñi ) minus
total expected malpractice liability costs ñi ρi (.)Pi . The second component is an
idiosyncratic locational preference of physician j for practicing in jurisdiction
i (ij ). Let 1j = 0 for all j and 2j be distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function F (2 ) over the support (−∞

, ∞ ). This means that 2j is

physician j’s relative preference for practicing in jurisdiction 2 instead of jurisdiction 1. Let dF (.) be symmetric around the origin to abstract away from any
systematic preference for one jurisdiction over another. Therefore, physician
j’s location choice c?j is jurisdiction i if and only if:
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πi + ij ≥ πk + kj
where

i, k ∈ {1, 2}, i 6
=k

  
s
πi = πi (wi , Pi ) = max wi ñi − ñi · ρi
Pi
ni ≥0
ñi

Since πi (wi , Pi ) is a function of ñi instead of n?i , location decisions are based
on the actual number of patients each physician would treat in jurisdiction i
rather than that which the physician would like to treat. Since n?i is unaffected
by Di , while ñi may be affected by Di , the net returns from practicing that
each physician j uses to make her location decision must be consistent with
the location decisions of every other physician (cl6=j ).
Assume that the market for health insurance is perfectly competitive in
each jurisdiction. This means that, in equilibrium, the insurance policies offered to consumers in jurisdiction i must be that which maximizes expected
consumer utility subject to a zero-profit constraint. All results are identical
whether there is a single insurer in each jurisdiction, or alternatively, a single
insurer across jurisdictions facing potential jurisdiction-based entrants. All insurers operating in this environment are managed care organizations (MCO),
and as such, sign contracts with both consumers (for Qi and τi ) as well as a
contract with physicians. As a simplification of the model in Chapter 2, the
contract between an MCO in jurisdiction i and a physician consists of a payment (wi ) for each policyholder the physician treats. It is assumed that MCOs
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and physicians cannot contract directly on ni . In the real world, this type of
contract would be extremely costly to enforce due to the vast heterogeneity
across patients and illnesses and the difficulty in verifying illness and proper
treatment for the purposes of a contract. Instead, contracts require physicians
to exercise judgement in determining whether and what kind of treatment is
provided. Even though this model abstracts away from heterogeneity across
patients within a given jurisdiction, it assumes the contracting problem to exist
without explicitly modelling it. Therefore, the number of patients treated enters each MCO’s problem as an incentive compatibility constraint rather than
a choice variable.
Given the structure of the contracts, the competition in the health insurance market, and the need for incentive compatibility, the {Qi , τi } offered by an
MCO to consumers depends on the choice of wi , and the resulting behaviour
of physicians. A patient’s recovery in this model is the result of two events.
First, the patient must gain access to a physician in order to receive medical
services. If patients are allocated randomly across physicians in a given jurisdiction, and the number of patients treated does not exceed the number of ill
consumers, then the probability that any patient gains access to care is

Di ni
.
qi

Second, conditional on gaining access to a physician and receiving treatment,
the probability that the treatment is successful and leads to recovery is 1− ρi (.).
Thus, the probability of recovery (Qi ) is the product of these two probabilities:
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s
Di ni
s
Q i ni ,
=
1 − ρi
ni
qi
ni

Due to perfect competition, the MCO in jurisdiction i must set the revenues
from the sale of health insurance policies to each of the measure 1 of consumers
(τi ) equal to the costs of treating patients. With Di physicians each treating ñi
patients at a cost to the insurer of wi per patient, these total costs equal Di ñi wi .
Therefore, the MCO in jurisdiction i solves the problem:


max
wi


(1 − qi )Ui (mi − τi , Hi1 ) + qi Ui (mi − τi , Hi2 ) + qi Q̃i · ∆Ui

where τi = Di ñi wi

 

 
s
Di ñi
s
Q̃i = Qi ñi ,
=
1 − ρi
ñi
qi
ñi
∆Ui = Ui (mi − τi , Hi1 ) − Ui (mi − τi , Hi2 )

Given {s, D, {qi , mi , Hi1 , Hi,2 , Pi }i=1,2 }, equilibrium is each physician j’s location choice c?j , a physician’s choice of caseload size in jurisdiction i, {n?i (wi , s, Pi )}i=1,2 ,
and each MCO’s choice of a payment per patient, {wi? }i=1,2 such that:
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(
1) given cl6=j ,

c?j =

1 if π1 ≥ π2 + 2j ;

2 otherwise.

  
s
?
2) ni (wi , s, Pi ) = arg max wi ni − ni · ρi
Pi
ni
ni ≥0


?
3) wi = arg max EUi τi = Di ñi wi
wi ≥0

3.3

Equilibrium: Analytical

The condition characterizing a physician’s optimal caseload size n?i (wi , s, Pi ) is
the same as in Chapter 2. A physician practicing in jurisdiction i, and thus
facing wi and Pi , would like to set ni such that:

     
s
s
wi
s
=ρ
−
· ρ0
Pi
ni
ni
ni

where ρ0 (.) is the first derivative of ρ(.). A unique finite solution exists
for all wi ∈ [0, Pi ). Changes in wi and Pi produce the opposite effects on n?i .
An increase in wi increases the profitability of the marginal patient and induces physicians to increase their caseloads, thus both increasing total revenues as well as taking on greater liability exposure. An increase in Pi makes
the marginal patient too risky to treat, causing physicians to reduce liability
exposure by taking on fewer patients.
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Physicians’ location decisions depend on the actual number of patients they
would treat in each jurisdiction ñi rather than the number they would like to
treat. This is important in determining whether or not n?i is a best response
of a physician locating in jurisdiction i. If n?i <

qi
,
Di

then n?i is the only element

of the argmax in the physician’s problem. The case of n?i ≥

qi
Di

is slightly more

complicated since ñi is unchanging as n?i increases. In this case, therefore, the
h


h
in this case, it
argmax consists of the set Dqii , ∞ . However, since n?i ∈ Dqii , ∞
is therefore always a best response for every physician practicing in jurisdiction
i to choose the caseload size n?i .
Physician j must compare the net returns from practicing in the two jurisdictions. Since there is a continuum of physicians, the measure of physician j
is infinitesimal. Therefore, the location decisions of every other physician (cl6=j )
result in D1 and D2 physicians practicing in jurisdictions 1 and 2 respectively.
Given (cl6=j ), and thus D1 and D2 , it is optimal for physician j to locate in jurisdiction 1 if 2j ≤ π1 − π2 , and in jurisdiction 2 otherwise. Given the distributional
assumptions on 2j , and that this decision rule must hold for all j, it must be
true in equilibrium that D1 = D· F (π1 − π2 ) and D2 = D· (1 − F (π1 − π2 )).
The first-order condition from MCO i’s problem is:

qi ∆Ui

∂ Q̃i
∂τi
= W M Uyi
∂wi
∂wi

(3.1)
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where W M Uyi is the “weighted marginal utility of consumption” in jurisdiction i, and can be considered the expected marginal utility of consumption for
a consumer after purchasing health insurance.
The left side of Equation 3.1 is the marginal benefit of increasing physician
 
Q̃i
that
payments in jurisdiction i (M Bi ). It is the increase in the likelihood ∂∂w
i
the ill consumers in jurisdiction i (with measure qi ) will receive the increase in
utility that arises due to recovery (∆Ui ). The right side is the marginal cost
(M Ci ). It is the value of the consumption forgone as the price of insurance
increases to fund the increased physician payments.
h

If the Inada conditions hold, then wi? ∈ 0, mqii . As wi approaches the upper
bound of this range, consumption would be driven to zero, causing W M Uyi to
approach infinity and the first-order condition to be violated. The MCOs’ problems are complicated because neither

∂ Q̃i
∂wi

nor

∂τi
∂wi

is necessarily continuous in

wi . The principal effects of increasing wi are first, an increase in physicians


∂πi
i
practicing in jurisdiction i ∂D
≥
0
since
≥
0
and second, each physician
∂wi
∂wi
 ?

∂n
desiring a greater caseload ∂wii ≥ 0 . As long as n?i < Dqii , the product Di ñi increases in wi . Once n?i ≥

qi
,
Di

the product equals qi ; a constant. This is because,

even though the higher payments induce more physicians to locate in jurisdiction i, the scarcity of ill consumers results in each of those physicians actually
treating fewer patients, even though they would like to treat more. This results in a discontinuous negative shift in both

∂ Q̃i
∂wi

and

∂τi
∂wi

once wi is such that
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Figure 3.1:

n?i =

qi
.
Di

Limited-Access Solution

This value of wi is labelled “ŵi ” in Figures 3.1 to 3.3. The disconti-

nuities mean that an equilibrium could exist where the first-order conditions
do not hold, as in Figure 3.3. That is, it could be optimal for an MCO to set
wi = ŵi . A jurisdiction i in this kind of equilibrium would be characterized by
a condition other than its first-order condition, namely n?i =

qi
.
Di

Altogether, there are three types of solution for each MCO’s problem: limited





access n?i < Dqii , full-access-corner n?i = Dqii , and full-access-interior n?i > Dqii .
These different types of solution are shown in Figures 3.1 to 3.3. Since there
are two MCOs modelled here, the possible combinations of the three potential solution types result in six potential equilibrium types. Even though there
is the potential for a no-insurance equilibrium (wi? = 0), this case will not be
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Figure 3.2:

Full-Access-Interior Solution

Figure 3.3:

Full-Access-Corner Solution
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investigated here since it is easily distinguished from the other potential equilibrium types. Each set of these equilibrium choices {wi? }i=1,2 is characterized
by a pair of conditions for i = 1, 2:

if n?i (wi? , s, Pi ) 6
=

qi
,
Di

qi ∆Ui

else

3.4

∂ Q̃i
∂τi
= W M Uyi
∂wi
∂wi
qi
n?i (wi? , s, Pi ) =
Di

Equilibrium: Numerical

In order to investigate these equilibria numerically, assume the following functional forms:

ρi (t) =

1
,
1 + αi t

Ui (yi , Hi ) = Hi βi yi 1−βi ,

2j ∼ N(0, σ 2 )

where αi > 0, 0 < βi < 1, and σ 2 > 0. Besides complying with the conditions
posed earlier, the choice of functional form for ρi (.) is convenient as it yields a
closed form solution for n?i , which is non-negative and finite for all wi ∈[0, P ):

n?i = αi s

"

Pi
P i − wi

 12

#
− 1
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The MCO’s problem is complicated by the relationships between wi , πi , and
Di . Given a choice of w1 and w2 ; π1 , π2 , D1 , and D2 would be determined simultaneously by the system of equations:


s
P1
π1 = w1 ñ1 − ñ1 ρ1
ñ1
 
s
π2 = w2 ñ2 − ñ2 ρ2
P2
ñ2


D1 = D · F (π1 − π2 )
D2 = D · (1 − F (π1 − π2 ))

Since ñi is case-specific, and these cases depend on Di , this system is computationally difficult to work with. Alternatively, since Di is monotonically
increasing in πi , and πi is monotonically increasing in wi , any pair {π1 , π2 } produces the unique pairs {D1 (π1 , π2 ), D2 (π1 , π2 )} and {w1 (π1 , π2 ), w2 (π1 , π2 )} such
that:
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D1 (π1 , π2 ) = D · F (π1 − π2 )
D2 (π1 , π2 ) = D · (1 − F (π1 − π2 ))

 
 w such that π1 = wn?1 − n?1 ρ1 s? P1


 n1

w1 (π1 , π2 ) =
D
(π
,π
)s
D
(π
,π
)
1
1
2
1
1
2

π1 + ρ 1
P1
q1
q1

 
 w such that π2 = wn?2 − n?2 ρ2 s? P2



 n2
w2 (π1 , π2 ) =
D
(π
,π
)
D
(π
,π
)s
2
1
2
2
1
2

π2 + ρ 2
P2
q2
q2

if n?1 (w, s, P1 ) <

q1
;
D1 (π1 ,π2 )

otherwise.
if n?2 (w, s, P2 ) <

q2
;
D2 (π1 ,π2 )

otherwise.

without having to simultaneously solve a system of equations. Therefore,
instead of choosing wi , each MCO will do the equivalent of choosing πi to solve
its problem given the other MCO’s choice of πk .
The program solves MCO i’s problem given a parameterized value of the
other MCO’s net return from practicing (π̄k0 ). It then compares the solution
to that problem πi? (π̄k0 ) with the initial parameterized value used in the other
MCO’s problem (π̄i0 ). If πi? (π̄k0 ) −

π̄i0 for either MCO is greater than some tol-

erance parameter, the program replaces both π̄i0 with π̄i1 = πi? (π̄k0 ) and then
resolves the two MCO’s problems until the solutions converge to the updated
parameterized values.
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3.5

Results

The purpose of the numerical simulations is to examine the effects of rising
malpractice pressure on variables of interest in the two jurisdictions. This is
done in three parts. Part 1 examines the effect of rising malpractice pressure in
jurisdiction 1 while the malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 2 is held constant
at a level such that MCO 2 offers full access to its policyholders. Other than the
difference in malpractice pressure, the two jurisdictions are identical in every
parameter. Part 2 does the same, with the exception that malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 2 is held constant and is high enough to induce MCO 2 to
provide only limited access. These exercises allow for investigation into possible systematic biases in the coefficients uncovered by studies using data at the
jurisdiction-level (state or county) without accounting for physician mobility.
Part 3 has a different purpose from Parts 1 and 2. It is designed to investigate
the effects on two distinct populations of increases in a common level of malpractice pressure (P1 = P2 = P ) when physicians can decide whether and how
much to focus on each population. In this context, a population is equivalent to
a jurisdiction, where one group has higher income than the other. This allows
for investigation into the differential effects of rising malpractice pressure on
rich versus poor consumers.
As parameter values in all three parts, assume that the measure of the entire set of physicians (D) is 0.2 and that each physician possesses resources
(s) equal to 50. The variance on physicians’ relative locational preference (σ 2 )
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is 50. The technology parameter of converting resources into successful outcomes from treatment (αi ) is set at 2. The probability of becoming ill in either
jurisdiction (qi ) is 0.5, and health statuses Hi1 and Hi2 are 1 and 0.5 respectively. For Parts 1 and 2, consumer income in either jurisdiction (mi ) is set
at 100. In Part 3, while m1 remains at 100, m2 is reduced to 90. As a tolerance parameter used in the numerical optimization, equilibrium {π1? , π2? } is
considered found on the z th iteration if and only if πi? (π̄kz ) −

π̄iz ≤ 0.1 for both

jurisdictions.1 Let the equilibrium values for the number of doctors emerging
in jurisdiction i in equilibrium be Di? = Di (π1? , π2? ), each physician’s caseload
size be ñ?i = min{n?i (wi (π1? , π2? ), s, Pi ), Dqi? }, and equilibrium health care system
i


?
? s
quality be Q̃i = Qi ñi , ñ? .
i

3.5.1

Part 1: Jurisdiction 2 at Full-Access

The first numerical exercise examines the set of P1 values [990, 1189] and a single P2 value of 200. As shown in Figure 3.4, these values are chosen to cover the
transition in jurisdiction 1 from full-access to limited-access solutions while jurisdiction 2 only provides full access to its policyholders. Jurisdiction 1 exhibits
the same relationship between malpractice pressure and access found in Chapter 2. MCO 1 provides consumers with a health insurance policy with full access to physicians as long as consumers are willing to pay for it. As malpractice
pressure rises, this willingness to pay holds initially, but eventually the cost of
1
The value of πi? never fell below 130 for any parameter values investigated, making this a
relatively narrow tolerance.
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Figure 3.4:

The effects of rising malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 1 on patient access to physicians in both
jurisdictions. Malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 2 is such that MCO 2 provides full access to its policyholders.

maintaining full access becomes so high that consumers would rather keep
more of their income for consumption and instead purchase cheaper health insurance with imperfect access to physicians.
As seen in Figure 3.5, physicians flow into jurisdiction 1 as long as MCO
1 maintains full access in the face of rising malpractice pressure. This means
that, even though malpractice pressure is rising in jurisdiction 1, consumers
in jurisdiction 1 are willing to pay for increases to physician payments that are
sufficient to attract physicians willing to relocate. There are two reasons why
an MCO facing rising malpractice pressure might adjust it’s contracts to draw
in more physicians. First, the additional resources brought by the new physicians make each patient less costly to treat. Also, full-access health insurance
is cheaper to provide when there are many physicians instead of a few. This
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Figure 3.5: The effects of rising malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 1 on the movement of physicians when
jurisdiction 2 provides full access.

is because each physician’s total malpractice liability costs are convex and increasing in ni . This means that two physicians could treat a given number of
patients at a lower cost than could one physician. Therefore, rising malpractice
pressure induces MCOs to attract more physicians as additional resources and
cost savings they bring become more significant.
Even though some physicians flow between jurisdictions in equilibrium, it
is clear in Figure 3.6 that rising malpractice pressure causes two MCOs intent
on providing full access to compete for physicians. Even though malpractice
pressure in jurisdiction 2 remains constant, MCO 2 must raise the compensation it provides. This reduces the outflow of physicians and induces the remaining physicians to take on those patients who would have been treated by
their departing colleagues. This shows the different ways that the two jurisdictions are affected by rising jurisdiction 1 malpractice pressure. First, as a

85

Figure 3.6: The effects of rising malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 1 on health care spending in both jurisdictions when jurisdiction 2 provides full access.

Figure 3.7:

The effect of rising malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 1 on health care quality in both jurisdictions
when jurisdiction 2 provides full access.
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jurisdiction’s malpractice pressure rises, physicians become more valuable in a
jurisdiction where consumers are willing to pay for full access. This is because
malpractice pressure makes a given n?i more costly to induce, and thus Di relatively less costly in achieving full access. This jurisdiction would shift toward
more physicians, each treating fewer patients, in order to spread out the increased malpractice liability costs. Second, due to the efforts of consumers and
insurers in jursidiction 1 to raise physician payments, physicians become more
costly for jurisdiction 2 to retain. Since malpractice pressure is unchanged in
jurisdiction 2, the cost of inducing any n?2 is unchanged. The best response
is therefore to retain fewer physicians but have each one treat more patients
in order to maintain full access. Once malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 1
is high enough to cause MCO 1 to forgo full access, jurisdiction 2 becomes a
more favourable option to physicians and this competition decreases. The pattern of effects on health care system quality shown in Figure 3.7 reflect the
flow of physicians. Given the signs of the direct and cross-jurisdictional effects
in Figures 3.4 to 3.7, and extrapolating to a k-jurisdiction case, the presence
of cross-jurisdictional effects would bias the estimated effects of malpractice
pressure on health care spending biased toward zero, while also inflating the
effect on health care quality.
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Figure 3.8:

The effects of rising malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 1 on patient access to physicians in both
jurisdictions. Malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 2 is such that MCO 2 provides limited access to its policyholders.

3.5.2

Part 2: Jurisdiction 2 at Limited-Access

Part 2 performs the same numerical exercise as Part 1, with the exception that
P2 is held constant at 1500 instead of 200. This increase makes access in jurisdiction 2 costly enough to push jurisdiction 2 into a limited-access solution. As
shown in Figure 3.8, the same pattern of behaviour from MCO 1 has different
effects on access in jurisdiction 2 where consumers in jurisdiction 2 are unwilling to purchase full-access health insurance policies. As malpractice pressure
rises and MCO 1 maintains full access, it raises physicians’ compensation in
order to draw in more physicians. This makes it more costly for MCO 2 to keep
physicians in jurisdiction 2. The fact that consumers in jurisdiction 2 prefer
limited access to full access shows an unwillingness to pay for better access.
As MCO 1 competes for physicians more aggressively, access in jurisdiction 2
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Figure 3.9: The effects of rising malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 1 on the movement of physicians when
jurisdiction 2 provides limited access.

becomes more costly to provide, and so MCO 2 substitutes away from health
insurance.
The MCOs’ behaviour creates the same movement of physicians as in Part
1. Figure 3.9 shows that physicians are drawn to the jurisdiction willing to
maintain full access as malpractice pressure rises, and then leave the jurisdiction once this willingness is exhausted. As shown in Figure 3.10, however, the
effect of increasing jurisdiction 1 malpractice pressure on health care spending
in jurisdiction 2 is the opposite of that seen in Part 1. This is because MCO
2, while trying to maintain full access for its consumers, is willing to raise
the price of health insurance in order to secure the funds necessary to slow
the outflow of physicians. Where consumers in jurisdiction 2 are unwilling to
pay for full access, their MCO cannot raise the necessary funds to compete
with the aggressive behaviour from MCO 1. Alternatively, it substitutes away
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Figure 3.10:

The effects of rising malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 1 on health care spending in both jurisdictions when jurisdiction 2 provides limited access.

Figure 3.11:

The effect of rising malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 1 on health care quality in both jurisdictions
when jurisdiction 2 provides limited access.
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from health insurance by lowering the price and quality of an insurance policy.
Once jurisdiction 1 malpractice pressure reaches the point that MCO 1 chooses
to provide limited access, the reduction in competitive behaviour makes heath
insurance less costly to provide in jurisdiction 2. This causes MCO 2 to substitute toward health insurance, thus raising health care spending and quality, as
malpractice pressure in jurisdiction 1 increases. Figure 3.11 shows the effects
of this behaviour in health care quality in the two jurisdictions. Since it shows
the same pattern as Figure 3.7, cross-jurisdictional effects in the k-jurisdiction
case would create the same inflated estimates of malpractice pressure’s effect on quality, regardless of other jurisdictions’ behaviour surrounding access.
Figure 3.10 shows that malpractice pressure’s effect on health care spending
would be inflated when most other jurisdictions choose to provide their policy
holders with limited access; the opposite of the full-access case examined in
Part 1.

3.5.3

Part 3: Heterogeneous Jurisdictions, Common Malpractice Pressure

The final numerical exercise examines two jurisdictions that, while facing the
same rising level of malpractice pressure (P1 = P2 = P ), contain consumer populations that are different from one another. The purpose is to examine how
rising malpractice pressure would differentially affect two distinct populations,
between which physicians have some mobility. An obvious application is urban
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Figure 3.12:

The effects on patient access to physicians in both jurisdictions when they face the same rising
level of malpractice pressure. Consumers in jurisdiction 1 have higher incomes than those in jurisdiction 2.

versus rural consumers, and whether physicians’ mobility between urban and
rural areas of a state causes the two populations to experience a general rise
in malpractice pressure differently from one another2 . In the exercise, jurisdiction 1 is more wealthy (m1 = 100) than jurisdiction 2 (m2 = 90).
Consumers with relatively high income have a greater willingness to pay
for health insurance than those with low incomes. This is why, in Figure 3.12,
MCO 1 is willing to bear the cost of maintaining full access up until P = P̄1 ,
while MCO 2 must abandon full access at the lower level of P̄2 . This yields
three distinct ranges of malpractice pressure. As long as P < P̄2 , both MCOs
choose to provide full-access health insurance, while for all P > P̄1 , they offer
limited access. Finally, where P̄2 ≤ P ≤ P̄1 , MCO 1 maintains full access while
2

While these populations may not necessarily rely on separate health insurers, the same
bundles would be offered in the case of a single insurer facing potential entrants targeting
specific populations
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Figure 3.13:

The effects of rising malpractice pressure in the two jurisdictions on the movement of physicians.

MCO 2 chooses to provide limited access instead.
Figure 3.13 illustrates an important point about physician mobility. As long
as the solutions to the two MCOs problems exhibit the same kind of access (full
or limited) there is little movement of physicians in equilibrium. For this reason, a lack of observed movement of physicians between jurisdictions does not
necessarily indicate that physicians are immobile or that location decisions are
unaffected by malpractice pressure. Instead, the lack of movement could indicate a calm surface; where physicians are sensitive to malpractice pressure,
but due to escalating or abating competition for physicians among MCOs, their
equilibrium numbers in each jurisdiction are unaffected. When physicians do
exhibit mobility in equilibrium, it is from areas or populations that are unwilling or unable to pay the cost of full access to those that are. This offers an
explanation for the empirical finding that rural populations are particularly
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Figure 3.14:

The effects of rising malpractice pressure the two jurisdictions on health care spending in both

jurisdictions.

Figure 3.15:
jurisdictions.

The effect of rising malpractice pressure in the two jurisdictions on health care quality in both
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subject to outflows of physicians when malpractice pressure increases (General Accounting Office 2003). This would be the expected outcome since rural
areas generally enjoy lower access to health care than do urban areas (Chan et
al 2007). Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show the same relationships as in Parts 1 and
2. Rising malpractice pressure induces an MCO willing to pay for full access to
compete for physicians more agressively. Those unwilling to pay for full access
respond by substituting away from health insurance, instead providing less expensive and lower quality insurance policies and leaving consumers with more
income for consumption.

3.6

Summary and Implications

Several empirical investigations into the existence and extent of the practice of
defensive medicine utilize data at the jurisdiction level. The model specifications used by these studies assume that the extent of any effect of rising malpractice pressure on health care cost or quality is confined to that jurisdiction.
This ignores the potential cross-jurisdictional effects of changes in malpractice
pressure, which could introduce bias into estimates of the effects of changing
malpractice pressure on health care spending and quality.
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This study finds that physician mobility can result in one jurisdiction’s malpractice pressure affecting health care spending and quality in another jurisdiction. These cross-jurisdictional effects drive a wedge between the direct effects of tort reform with the aggregate effects, which is important to the discussion of tort reform as a policy tool for reducing national health care spending.
If cross-jurisdictional effects are present in a k-jurisdiction case, the signs of
these effects uncovered in this paper suggest that physician mobility would
inflate estimates of the effect of health care spending on health care system
quality. The effect on health care spending can be biased toward or away from
zero, depending on the prevailing level of access among these jurisdictions. Regarding the differential effects of defensive medicine, the model predicts that
for certain ranges of malpractice pressure, competing MCOs will induce mobile
physicians to remain immobile in equilibrium. Also, where physicians do relocate, they leave poorer jurisdictions for more wealthy ones, which matches the
findings in the empirical literature surrounding the departure of physicians
from rural areas to urban areas.
Beyond these results, significant cross-jurisdictional effects of changing malpractice pressure indicate the presence of externalities from jurisdiction-level
tort reform. Currently, all malpractice reform has been undertaken at the state
level. By changing competition among states for a scarce supply of mobile
physicians, malpractice reform in one state could create external costs and/or
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benefits for other states. Since these are not internalized by the state considering the malpractice reforms, the malpractice reform passed in equilibrium is
almost certain to deviate from the socially efficient amount. This adds to the
argument for a federal role in malpractice reform, which could manage tort
reform across states and internalize cross-jurisdictional effects in the effort to
limit the growth in national health care spending.

3.7
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Chapter 4
Mitigating Risk Selection with
Patient-Level Competitive
Bidding

4.1

Introduction

The field of health economics has struggled with methods of provider compensation for decades. The reason why this struggle is more pronounced in health
economics than in other sub-disciplines is the nature of information in the relationships between payers, providers, and patients. The asymmetry of information between payer and provider, in particular, creates contracting problems,
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and thus tradeoffs in every known method of provider compensation. Any investigation into the pros and cons of provider compensation methods must begin with the “selection-efficiency” tradeoff coined by Joseph Newhouse (1996).
At the heart of the tradeoff is heterogeneity and uncertainty in the cost of treatment across patients and illnesses, and how different compensation methods
distribute risk between payer and provider. Payers; which include government,
private health insurers, and large employers; tend do be the largest among the
players in markets for health care, and so are the most obvious candidate to
bear risk. Problems arise, however, because the cost of treatment is not completely exogenous, and is instead partly determined by the choices of providers
and patients. Under compensation arrangements like cost-based reimbursement and fee-for-service, both providers and patients can benefit from greater
quantity and quality while leaving the marginal cost of their decisions to be
borne by the payer. The result is incentives for over-utilization of health care
services in the treatment of all patients, and thus excessive health care expenditure (Bovbjerg et al 1987, Hoerger & Waters 1993, Newhouse 1996, Ellis
1998).
In order to mitigate these incentives, payers can reach cost sharing arrangements with the parties making treatment decisions. Examples of cost sharing
on the demand side include high deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance.
These mechanisms are verifiable among payers, providers, patients and monitors; making regulation easy (Frank et al 2000); but leave patients exposed to
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risk and “compromise the purpose of insurance” (Eggleston 2000). Cost sharing
can take place on the supply side as well. Alternatives to cost-based or fee-forservice arrangements include capitation, where providers receive a lump-sum
per patient enrolled or treated, and prospective payment, which pays based
on predetermined rates independent of patient-specific costs. The benefit of
supply-side cost sharing is the placement of both revenue certainty and cost
risk with providers, who are larger than patients and better able to bear uncertainty (Ellis & McGuire 1986, van de Ven et al 2003). With providers bearing
the full marginal cost of treatment decisions, there is the incentive to reduce
the utilization of services, and thus expenditures (Newhouse 1996, Eggleston
2000). On the other hand, this incentive to reduce utilization can lead to underprovision of services and the avoidance of patients likely to require expensive
treatments. While the prospect of medical malpractice lawsuits and published
measures of quality can reduce the incentive to under-treat patients, these
considerations can exacerbate the avoidance problem, since these encourage
providers to accept the patients most likely to recover and be pleased with service (Frank et al 2000).
Risk selection is the efforts by health plans or providers to enroll patients
believed to be low-risk or low-cost (cream-skimming), and to disenroll (or dump)
high-risk or high-cost patients (Pauly 1984, Eggleston 2000). Such efforts
would only be temporary in a perfectly competitive market for health services
since separate prices would emerge for different risk types and equalize the
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relative profitability of patients across risk type (Pauly 1984, Diamond 1992).
The problem occurs when separate prices cannot emerge because payers either
cannot distinguish between risk types, or are constrained by regulation from
pricing along certain dimensions associated with risk type. This includes regulated community rating on the basis of gender and age (Pauly et al 1991), characteristics that explain only a small part of the variance in health care expenditure and thus contain within-community heterogeneity in risk (Beck 2000).
Given pricing based on community averages, managed care organizations have
incentives to enroll only those patients with expected treatment costs that fall
below these prices, and avoid all others (Beck 2000). Where successful, risk
selection results in broken pooling arrangements, where payers pay too much
for patients accepted by providers, and must make alternative (often inferior)
arrangements for those rejected (van de Ven et al 2003). Risk selection is often
performed as part the provider’s day-to-day operations, making it difficult for
payers and policymakers to regulate selection practices (Chalkley & Malcomson 2000, Frank et al 2000). The profitability of risk selection for one provider
can result in risk selection as a dominant strategy across all providers, since
greater concentrations of rejected high-risk patients seeking care would reduce
the profitability of non-selecting providers (Frank et al 2000, Eggleston 2000,
van de Ven et al 2003).
Adverse selection is distinct from risk selection, although the practice of the

102

two in health care is often indistinguishable. Unlike risk selection, adverse selection is behaviour on the demand side, where patients and policyholders have
information superior to payers and providers regarding underlying health risks
or preferences for consuming health services (Pauly 1984, Eggleston 2000). The
distinction becomes blurred in the various methods of indirect risk selection,
where providers design plans to be attractive to certain risk groups, and thus
induce adverse selection. While mandatory coverage for basic services would
eliminate adverse selection, at least in basic services (Pauly et al 1991), risk selection can persist where providers can attract the risks they deem favourable.
The rise in capitation and prospective payment in the United States has
coincided with the rise in various forms of managed care since the 1960s. Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) are contractual arrangements between insurers and providers that coordinate the financing and delivery of health care. By
1983, Medicare developed a prospective payment system based on diagnosisrelated groups (DRGs) to compensate hospitals, and for physicians’ fees in 1984
(Hoerger & Waters 1993). By the end of the 20th century, three quarters of private health insurance was under managed care and over 14% of Medicare and
40% of Medicaid patients were enrolled in health plans using capitation (Frank
et al 2000). Medicare Advantage, which pays private managed care organizations by capitation, currently serves roughly one quarter of Medicare beneficiaries (Brown et al 2011). The large number and percentage of governmentsponsored enrollees under capitated arrangements indicates the potential for
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risk selection among vulnerable populations.
The most commonly suggested solution to risk selection is risk adjustment.
It requires that payers classify patients according to verifiable characteristics,
and then set different payments for each classification that increase with the
expected cost of treatment. Typical dimensions of risk adjustment include age,
gender, and geographic area of residence. The optimal set of payments would be
high enough for high cost patients to make providers indifferent among all patient types, eliminating the incentive to select low risks. There are criticisms of
risk adjustment as a solution to risk selection. The first concerns the practicality of a classification system so fine that it captures all within-group cost variation observable to providers (Chalkley & Malcomson 2000). Improvements in
risk adjustment may require costly investments in research, and could start
an “information race” between payers and providers interested in gaining an
informational advantage (Barros 2003). Furthermore, it may be inappropriate
to adjust on the basis of some relevant characteristics, particularly those under
the control of providers, in order to preserve incentives for cost-effective innovation (Schokkaert & Van de Voorde 2004). Therefore, in order to completely
eliminate risk selection, risk adjustment must be perfect both over time and
across all cost-relevant patient characteristics, which is practically impossible.
A second potential solution to risk selection is open enrollment, which allows consumers to switch between health plans, with guaranteed acceptance
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and renewal. While this eliminates the most direct form of risk selection (outright refusal), there are several methods of indirect risk selection. These include underservice to motivate selective disenrollment (Newhouse 1996, Brown
et al 2011), reducing capacity in high cost service areas (Frank et al 2000), becoming ill-equipped to accommodate the most severe cases (Chalkley & Malcomson 2000), selective marketing, designing supplemental coverage to appeal
to healthy types (Eggleston 2000, van de Ven et al 2003, Brown et al 2011),
greater online presence to attract tech-savvy types, helping unprofitable patients switch, using screening software, and ignoring phone calls from unprofitable consumers (van de Ven et al 2003). Such internal business decisions are
difficult to regulate, and so health plans can and do engage in risk selection
despite open enrollment rules (Glazer & McGuire 2000, Barros 2003, van de
Ven et al 2003, Beck et al 2010, van de Ven et al 2007).
In an abstract sense, risk selection occurs when a payer, seeking a service on behalf of a set of patients, offers a uniform price to a set of potential
providers, each of which has private information regarding the costliness or
riskiness of agreeing to treat each patient. In cases of asymmetric information
such as these, a procurement auction is superior to uniform pricing, since it
both motivates the revelation of private information and results in an equilibrium within the set of core (and thus efficient) allocations (Milgrom 1985). In
mapping risk selection into an auction environment, the payer is a principal,
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the providers are bidders, and a given patient is a contract. The association assumes that providers wish to reject patients whenever they determine that the
expected cost of accepting said patient is greater than the capitation fee offered
by the payer. These expected treatment costs are private information that is
discarded upon rejection under a uniform pricing scheme like capitation, while
it is aggregated when providers can bid competitively to serve each patient.
Furthermore, competitive bids over patients can adjust rapidly to provider- or
industry-specific changes production costs, and reward cost-reducing innovations.
Competitive bidding arrangements have been proposed both in the past
(Hogan 1983, Christianson & Smith 1984, Pauly et al 1991, Keijser & KirkmanLiff 1992) and in more recent health policy discussions (Berwick & Hackbarth
2012, Feldman et al 2012). The main drawbacks of competitive bidding in
the context of health care concern limitations on consumer choice and quality assurance (Bovbjerg et al 1987, Hoerger & Waters 1993, Newhouse 1996),
which are also concerns with capitation and prospective payment. Thus the
opportunity cost of incorporating competitive bidding into capitation systems
is minimal. Existing attempts and proposals all involve the use of competitive bidding to price services rather than combat risk selection by pricing individual patients. This paper investigates the second type of bidding system
by evaluating two compensation regimes. The first is a traditional capitation
system, where providers are offered a fixed fee per consumer they take on.
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Given this capitation, consumers and providers interact, and providers accept
favourable risks and reject the rest. Consumers deemed profitable by at least
one provider are assumed to enjoy superior health to those who are universally
rejected and do not receive dedicated care. The second regime starts similarly
to the first. Providers are offered a capitation fee, consumers and providers interact, and providers take on those they find acceptable. The difference in the
second regime is, upon rejecting a consumer, a provider must submit a minimum acceptable payment at which the consumer would be acceptable. The
final step, for those consumers rejected by all providers, the payer awards the
service contract to the provider submitting the lowest amount, and pays this
provider the second-lowest submitted amount.
The model shows that, regardless of the degree of information asymmetry
between payer and providers and the variation in treatment costs, risk selection always occurs in equilibrium in a pure capitation system and never occurs
once competitive bidding is incorporated. It also shows that a system with
a mix of allocations, by both capitation and competitive bids, is superior to a
system where all consumers are allocated by competitive bids. Finally, the paper shows sufficient conditions under which the mixed system dominates the
pure capitation system. When this dominance holds, the mixed allocation system carries all the benefits of capitation and prospective payments without the
drawback of risk selection, and is not subject to a selection-efficiency tradeoff.
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4.2

Literature Review

The extent to which risk selection can take place depends on several factors.
First, there must be substantial variation in health care expenditures across
patients within payment groups. Of all DRGs in Medicare’s initial classification system, one sixth exhibited cost distributions with standard deviations
exceeding means (Dranove 1987). Substantial variation alone, however, is not
enough for risk selection to occur. In order to engage in risk selection, providers
must be able to use observable characteristics to predict within-group variation
in patient costs. This would be indicated where providers are able to predict a
greater share of the variation in health care spending than that predicted by
the risk adjustment models used by payers. Medicare’s initial risk adjustment
on age, gender, disability, and Medicaid status could explain approximately 1%
of the variation (Brown et al 2011) while hospitals in the same time frame
could predict between 10% and 20% of the variation in hospital costs based on
characteristics observable upon admission (Dranove 1987). Payers have made
advances in risk adjustment models, but the predictive power of payment categories has remained relatively low. Medicare’s current risk adjustment scheme,
the Hierarchical Conditions Categories model, constructs 70 disease categories
out of 15,000 disease codes, and can explain 11% of the variation in health care
expenditure, although it systematically underpredicts above-average expenditures (Brown et al 2011). Adjusting based on prior health care utilization, such
as hospitalization in the previous year, was able to explain less than 10% of the
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variance in the US (Glazer & McGuire 2000) and close to 14% in Switzerland
(Beck 2000), although including health care utilization introduces incentives
to over-utilize in health plans based on gatekeeper models.
Much of the analysis of whether favourable selection takes place for managed care organizations concerns comparisons between the time t health care
expenditures of “stayers”, who are patients electing to remain in a given health
plan, and those of “switchers”, who are those patients choosing to switch plans
in time t + 1. Several studies have found that patients switching from feefor-service plans to capitated plans exhibited 11% to 37% lower health care
expenditure than their staying counterparts, while switches in the opposite direction incurred 18% to 60% higher expenditure (Beck 2000, Frank et al 2000,
Glazer & McGuire 2000, Nicholson et al 2004, Brown et al 2011). While this
indicates that low-risk patients select into capitated arrangements and highrisk select into fee-for-service, it does not show that this selection is specifically
risk selection instead of adverse selection. The most compelling evidence that
risk selection occurs is the recent working paper by Brown et al (2011) showing
changes in the margins of selection before and after comprehensive changes to
Medicare’s risk adjustment formula in 2003. The evidence shows that selection
decreased along the dimensions included in the risk adjustment formula, but
increased along those dimensions excluded. Since the reforms would not have
affected patients’ choice of plan, this indicates that risk adjustment made selection along certain dimensions unprofitable, inducing providers to shift selection
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efforts into alternate patient characteristics. As the study showed, the persistence of risk selection resulted in the comprehensive risk adjustment scheme
having no statistically significant impact on selection overall.
Competitive bidding has been utilized on a limited basis in health services
markets since the 1970s. Almost exclusively, the goal of these bidding systems was pricing services. These included laboratory services in New York City
and mental health services in Massachusetts (Schlesinger 1986, McCombs &
Christianson 1987), as well as per-diem hospital care for Medicaid patients
in California and Wisconsin (Bovbjerg et al 1987, Paringer & McCall 1990).
The Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS) began in 1982
with a competitive bidding component. Providers were required to submit percapita bids in four categories of service for each of five patient categories, as
well as the maximum number patients they could accommodate (Christianson
& Smith 1984). At the federal level in the United States, The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services launched demonstration projects with competitive
bidding for durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies
in 1997 (Katzman & McGeary 2008) and laboratory services in 2003 (Waters
2006). The closest system utilizing bidding at the patient level is CareAuction.nl in the Netherlands for maternity care. Consumers report the amount of
maternity care hours needed to insurers, who put these needs on a web site facilitating bids by providers. The system’s allocation rule is based primarily on
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consumer preference rather than lowest price, and given the homogenous nature of the product, the system is designed to induce high quality care rather
than allocate heterogeneous patients at the lowest cost (Smits & Jansen 2008).
The effectiveness of these competitive bidding systems has been mixed, but
generally positive. Organized industry opposition in New York City and Massachusetts and the resulting lack of competition caused those two systems to be
unsuccessful (McCombs & Christianson 1987). Despite cost savings not being
the primary goal, CareAuction.nl has achieved 2% to 4% in spending reductions
(Smits & Jansen 2008). In Arizona, AHCCCS costs rose 34.2% over eight years,
compared to traditional Medicaid cost increases of 60.7% (Paringer & McCall
1990), resulting in savings of 11% of medical costs and 7% of total costs relative
to traditional Medicaid (Iglehart 1995). In the first year of California’s system,
per-diem payments fell 15% to 16% where they had previously been rising at
7% per year (Bovbjerg et al 1987). Bidding reduced Medicare expenditure on
durable medical equipment by 19% (Mechanic & Altman 2010), but met significant opposition from the clinical laboratory industry that resulted in motions
to cease the demonstration project (Garrott 2007). Besides industry opposition,
these competitive bidding systems encountered several problems. First, allocation rules based on weighted averages of submitted bid prices can produce
inefficient allocations and result in winners selectively avoiding unprofitable
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procedures (Katzman & McGeary 2008). A lack of transparency between bidding authority and bidders, and not allowing bidders enough time to gather information and secure reinsurance, created uncertainty and inflated bids (Hillman & Christianson 1984, Waters 2006). Further concerns include political
controversy, uncertainty over system costs (Christianson & Smith 1984), and
concerns about both not enough competition (Hoerger & Waters 1993) and “too
much” competition where small and rural providers are priced out (Waters
2006, Garrott 2007).

4.3

The Model

There is a population of consumers of measure 1. Consumers are identical
in endowed income m and preferences represented by the quasi-concave utility function U (y, H), where y is consumption and H is health status. Health
status is binary and determined by whether or not the consumer has a dedicated care provider in the event of illness, which for simplicity is assumed
to occur with probability 1. Those consumers with a dedicated provider enjoy
health status H1 and those without enjoy H2 , where H1 > H2 . Like Kifmann &
Lorenz (2011), consumer interactions with providers post-match are not modelled here, though incentives would be the same in any of the payment mechanisms investigated. Consumers are heterogenous in ex ante risk type k, which
is unobservable to consumers. There are K ∈Z++ different types and the share
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of consumers of risk type k is αk , where

K
P

αk = 1.

k=1

Consumers match randomly and sequentially with each of n ∈Z++ identical
health care providers, where n ≥ 2. Each provider is unaware of its place in
the order of these matches. The simplest interpretation of n is the total number of providers available to meet with a consumer. Alternatively, even though
the steps are not modelled here, n could be the number of providers consumers
visit before either falling ill or giving up the search. Providers are risk-neutral
income maximizers. The cost to provider j of taking on consumer i of risk type
k is cijk . These costs are drawn independently from the distribution Fk (c), with
corresponding probability density function fk (c) over the support [c, c̄]. The
assumption of a common support across distributions ensures that other players cannot directly infer consumer type based on any reports of cijk . Assume
that these distributions are smooth, continuous, atomless, and that distribution Fk−1 (c) is first-order stochasitically dominated by distribution Fk (c) for all
k ≥ 2. This implies and that the average cost of treating a consumer is increasing in ex ante risk type. Assume that consumer risk type is verifiable among
providers, while cijk is private information held by provider j. Any provider
is able to engage in risk selection, and thus can reject excessively costly consumers. Consumer utility is unaffected by the number of rejections as long as
it is less than n. This means that a consumer accepted by the first provider
visited would be just as well off as one rejected by the first n − 1 providers and
accepted by the nth provider.
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There is a payer operating in a perfectly competitive market for health insurance. The payer takes in revenue of τ per insurance policy sold to consumers, and compensates providers for taking on consumers. The payer cannot condition compensation on risk type. This is either due to superiority of
information among providers, or a conscious effort by the payer (or a regulator of payers) to disregard a set of variables affecting risk type when pursuing risk adjustment. Therefore, the payer chooses the capitation rate w at
which providers are compensated per consumer taken on, regardless of risk
type. Competition motivates the payer to choose the capitation rate that maximizes expected consumer utility. For those policyholders that fail to be taken
on by a dedicated care provider, the payer bears a cost wER . This is the cost
of having the policyholder’s ailment treated outside of a primary care setting,
such as an emergency room or acute care setting for a preventable illness.

4.4

Equilibrium: Capitation

The first compensation method evaluated is a simple capitation system, where
payers charge τc per health insurance policy and offer providers a fixed fee per
consumer taken on. Given this capitation, and since they are able to select
risks, providers take on those consumers they find profitable and reject those
who are not. Provider j’s problem when confronted with a consumer with cost
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of treatment cijk is whether to accept or reject that consumer. For each consumer accepted, the provider would receive w in revenue and bear cost cijk .
In rejecting a consumer, the provider takes in no revenue and bears no cost.
Therefore, in this subgame, each provider j has a simple optimal strategy:

accept if w − cijk ≥ 0
reject otherwise.

Given the assumptions on consumer costs, the probability that a given consumer of risk type k will be unacceptable to a provider is 1 − Fk (w). Since these
costs are independent across providers, the probability that all n providers will
find this consumer unacceptable is [1 − Fk (w)]n . The payer’s problem thus becomes:


max EUc (w) = U (m − τc , H1 ) −
w

K
X

n

αk [1 − Fk (w)] · ∆U

k=1

where τc = w +

K
X

αk [1 − Fk (w)]n · (wER − w)

k=1

∆U = U (m − τc , H1 ) − U (m − τc , H2 )
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While a higher capitation payment increases the chance that any consumer
secures a provider, it also increases the pure profit earned by providers treating consumers with low cijk values. The optimal w recognizes this trade-off.
The optimal capitation payment under the traditional capitation system (wc? )
satisfies:


X
K
K
X
∆U
n−1
n
αk [1 − Fk (w)]n (4.1)
αk [1 − Fk (w)] fk (w) = 1 −
+ wER − w
W M Uy
k=1
k=1

where W M Uy stands for “weighted marginal utility of consumption” and is
K
P
c ,H1 )
equal to ∂U (m−τ
−
αk [1 − Fk (w)]n ∂∆U
. The term on the left is the benefit
∂y
∂y
k=1

of a marginal increase in the capitation rate. More specifically, it is the increase in the measure of consumers both forgoing emergency room care (and
thus costing w instead of wER ) and also gaining the boost in utility from having
a primary care provider (∆U ), the value of which is measured in units of consumption once divided by W M Uy . The increase in costs due to the marginally
higher capitation rate on the measure of consumers already receiving care in
expectation is on the right.

Proposition 1: For any equilibrium capitation payment under the capitation system (wc? ), i) [1 − Fk (wc? )]n > 0 ∀ k, and ii) [1 − Fk−1 (wc? )]n < [1 − Fk (wc? )]n ∀ k ≥
2.
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Figure 4.1: Total spending under the capitation method for a given capitation payment. The light rectangle is
expenditure on consumers receiving primary care while the dark rectangle is expenditure on consumers rejected by
all n physicians
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Proof : As wc approaches c from above, the left side of Condition 4.1 remains
positive while the right side approaches zero. As wc approaches c̄ from below, the left side is driven to zero while the right side approaches 1. Since both
sides of Condition 4.1 are continuous in w, by the Intermediate Value Theorem,
there exists w ∈(c, c̄) such that Condition 4.1 holds. Since wc? < c̄ and the cost
of treating patients of any risk type is distributed over the support [c, c̄], then
[1 − Fk (wc? )]n > 0 ∀ k. Stochastic dominance assumptions imply that F1 (w) >
... > FK (w), which in turn implies that [1 − F1 (w)]n < ... < [1 − FK (w)]n . 

h
i
1
Intuitively, as wc approaches c̄, the slope of Fk−1 1 − (1 − r) n approaches infinity. This means that value of the infinitesimally small average gain in access
to primary care for the most costly consumers across risk type is outweighed
by the value of consumption forgone in order to cover the increase in payments
for those already receiving care. Therefore, in equilibrium under the pure capitation system, a positive measure of consumers will not find a dedicated care
provider, and the shares of higher risk types in this universally rejected group
are greater than in the consumer population.
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4.5

Equilibrium: Capitation-Plus

The second compensation mechanism begins similarly to the first. Providers
are offered a capitation fee, consumers and providers interact to draw cijk values, and providers take on those they find acceptable. The difference is that
under the second mechanism, upon rejecting a consumer, a provider must report to the payer an amount (βj ) at which the consumer would be acceptable.
These amounts are the providers’ “bids”. For those consumers rejected by all n
providers, the payer awards the consumer to the provider submitting the lowest bid, and pays this provider the second-lowest bid. Let this mechanism be
the “capitation-plus system”, in which the payer charges consumers τcp .
Working backward, the payer need allocate consumer i of risk type k on the
basis of bids if and only if the consumer has been rejected by all n providers.
Under the rules described above, this “all-reject” state is equivalent to a secondprice reverse or procurement auction, with the payer as the principal, all n
rejecting providers as bidders, and the universally rejected consumer as the
contract. It is well established in the literature that bidder j’s optimal bid

in such an auction βj? is the opportunity cost of the object for auction (cijk ).
From a rejecting provider’s perspective, any bid delivers a payoff of 0 in any
state where at least one provider found that consumer acceptable, and so the
optimal bid in the all-reject state is also optimal in the 2n − 1 other states.
Before submitting a bid, the provider must first decide whether to accept
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or reject. It is assumed, following Kirkman-Liff et al (1985), that a provider
can construct a subjective estimate of the probability of losing the contract for
a given set of bid prices. Let hk be the lowest treatment cost at which it is a
best response for any provider to reject a consumer of risk type k. Given the
capitation payment offered by the payer, the value of accepting is the same as
in the pure capitation system (w − cijk ). For any w < c̄, the value to the provider
of rejecting is strictly positive since there is a positive probability that the n − 1
other providers also reject and the patient is allocated based on bids. In such a
case, each rejecting provider has a non-negative expected payoff. The winning
bidder submitting cijk in a second-price auction would receive the lowest of the
set of bids higher than cijk . This payment (ĉ) is a random variable distributed
according to the cumulative distribution function 1 − Gk (ĉ) = 1 − [1 − Fk (ĉ)]n−1 .
The expected payment conditional on cijk being the lowest bid is:

Z
E(ĉ ĉ > cijk ) = cijk +

c̄

Gk (x)
dx.
cijk Gk (cijk )

(4.2)

This would be the bid of a provider with cost cijk in a first-price reverse
auction (Milgrom & Weber 1982, Huh & Roundy 2002), and also the expected
payment to a winning provider bidding cijk in a second-price reverse auction
due to the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson 1981). Therefore, the expected value of rejecting a consumer is the product of the probability that the
n− 1 other providers also reject (Gk (hk )), the probability that cijk represents the
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lowest bid

Gk (cijk )
Gk (hk )


, and the expected payoff conditional on cijk being the low-

est bid (E(ĉ ĉ > cijk ) − cijk ). Thus, unlike the capitation system, a provider’s
accept or reject decision is:

Gk (cijk )
accept if w ≥ cijk + G(hk ) ·
·
G(hk )

Z

c̄

Gk (x)
dx
cijk Gk (cijk )

(4.3)

reject otherwise.

Condition 4.3 defines hk :

Z

c̄

hk = hk (w, n) such that hk +

Gk (x) dx = w

(4.4)

hk

The right side of (4.3) is increasing in cijk , so the set of consumer costs
that would be rejected by a provider is [hk , c̄]. Therefore, when facing a consumer of type k, a capitation payment w, and n − 1 other providers, provider j
R c̄
would accept consumer i if cijk < hk . Since hk Gk (x) dx ≥ 0, it is clear that;
∀

n, w ∈ [c, c̄) ; hk (w, n) < w. Intuitively, given some cijk , the prospect of

realizing a positive payoff from the auction stage makes rejecting more attractive in the capitation-plus system than in the capitation system. This
means that any choice of capitation payment would induce more rejections
in the capitation-plus system than in the capitation system. Let Rk (w, n) =
[1 − Fk (hk )]n − [1 − Fk (w)]n be the increased likelihood that a patient of type k is
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rejected ex ante in the capitation-plus system relative to the capitation system,
given payment w .
Rather than the actual costs taken on by the providers, the expected payment to winning providers (ie. the expected second-lowest bid) is relevant to
the payer’s problem. When allocating a consumer of type k according to bids,
the probability that the second-lowest bid is less than π is the probability that
any two providers (of which there are n(n − 1) combinations) both bid below π
while the remaining n − 2 other providers bid higher. This means that the second lowest payment for a type k consumer is distributed according to the probability density function jk (π hk ) = n(n − 1)fk (π)[Fk (π) − Fk (hk )][1 − Fk (π)]n−2 .
Therefore, the expected payment to providers per consumer of type k allocated
by bids is:

Z

c̄

E[πk w, n] =

πjk (π hk ) dπ
hk

Under the capitation-plus system, each consumer is either accepted by a
provider during an initial match, or allocated to the lowest bidding provider in
the auction stage. This means that all consumers ultimately receive primary
care and enjoy health status H1 . Consumers enjoy expected utility EUcp (wcp ) =
U (m − τcp , H1 ), and so the payer’s problem becomes the minimization of health
care spending τcp :
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min τcp = w +
w

K
X

n





αk [1 − Fk (hk )] · (E[πk w, n] − w)

k=1


?
characterized by:
with the optimal capitation payment wcp

K
X



∂hk
n
αk [1 − Fk (hk )]
fk (hk )
(E(πk w, n) − w)
∂w
k=1


K
K
X
X
n
n ∂E(.)
= 1−
αk [1 − Fk (hk )] +
αk [1 − Fk (hk )]
∂w
k=1
k=1
n−1



(4.5)

.
The left side of the equation represents the marginal benefit of increasing
the capitation payment in the capitation-plus system. The top term is the reduction in the measure of consumers expected to be allocated in the auction
stage, each of whom brings the additional cost (E(πk w, n) − w) above the capitation fee. The right side of the equation is the marginal cost, which includes
the increased expense of both higher capitation fees on the measure of consumers avoiding the auction stage as well as higher expected payments in the
auction stage for those who do not.

Proposition 2:

K
P


n
?
αk 1 − Fk hk wcp
,n
< 1 in any equilibrium under

k=1

the capitation-plus system.
Proof : Define wk = wk (n) such that hk (wk , n) = c. This is the highest capitation
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Figure 4.2:

Total spending under the capitation-plus method for a given capitation payment. The light rectangle
is expenditure on consumers receiving primary care while the dark rectangle is expenditure on consumers allocated
in the auction stage
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payment such that providers still reject all consumers of type k, regardless of
cijk . The value of wk increases in k. Obtaining the first derivatives of hk (w) and
E(πk w, n):

∂hk
=
∂w

(

1
1−Gk (hk )

0




if hk (w, n) ≥ c;
otherwise.


nfk (hk ) ∂hk
E(πk w, n) − E(ĉ ĉ > hk )
1−Fk (hk ) ∂w

∂E(πk w, n)
=

∂w
 0

if hk (w, n) ≥ c;
otherwise.

and using (4.2) and (4.4) allows Condition 4.5 to be rearranged into:

K
X
k=1

Z

c̄

Gk (π) dπ = 1 −

αk nfk (hk )
hk

K
X

αk [1 − Fk (hk )]n .

k=1

As wcp approaches w1 from above, the right side of the equation approaches 0
while the left side approaches a value greater than 0. Therefore, costs could be

n
?
?
lowered by setting wcp strictly above w1 . Since wcp
> w1 ⇒ 1 − F1 h1 wcp
,n
<
K

n
P
?
1, so
αk 1 − Fk hk wcp
,n
< 1. 
k=1

Proposition 2 states that it is never optimal in the capitation-plus system to
set the capitation payment so low that every consumer is allocated by auction.
Costs can be reduced by having at least an infinitesimally small positive measure of type 1 consumers accepted before the auction stage because the newly
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accepted measure would cost w1 instead of E(π1 w1 , n) where w1 < E(π1 w1 , n).
Intuitively, a provider drawing cijk = hk is guaranteed to have the lowest bid
and win any auction for this patient, and can expect to realize a large payoff. When deciding whether or not to accept, however, such a provider realizes
that this payoff is not guaranteed. It is contingent on every other provider also
rejecting, which is the only case in which an auction occurs. By accepting, however, the provider assures itself of taking in revenues equal to the capitation
payment. Providers thus face a tradeoff between a high potential payoff from
rejecting versus a lower certain payoff from accepting, which the payer can
exploit by raising the capitation payment. The result is that at least a small
measure of patients are treated at a price equal to the capitation payment,
which is less than that measure would have cost if allocated by auction.

K
P



αk Rk (wc? , n)

E[πk wc? , n]

wc?



≤
Proposition 3: If
−
k=1


K

P
n
?
?
αk [1 − Fk (hk )] wER − E[πk wc , n] , then EUcp wcp
> EUc (wc? ).
k=1

Proof : By Proposition 1, [1 − Fk (wc? )]n > 0 ∀ k, meaning that in equilibrium,
a positive measure of consumers will not receive primary care under the capitation system. Due to the rules of the auction stage under the capitationplus system, all consumers eventually receive primary care. This means that,
for a given price of health insurance, the capitation-plus system delivers a
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Figure 4.3:

Spending differences under the two reimbursement methods for a fixed capitation payment

higher expected utility than the capitation system. The above condition im?
plies τc p(wc? ) ≤ τc (wc? ). Since wcp
is the solution to the cost-minimization prob
?
lem, it must be that τcp wcp
≤ τcp (wc? ). The condition is thus sufficient for


?
?
τcp wcp
≤ τ (wc? ), and therefore EUcp wcp
> EUc (wc? ). 

For a given capitation payment, there are two effects on the price of insurance to consider when switching from a pure capitation system to a capitationplus-auction system. First, under competitive bidding, those patients allocated
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by auction cost less than those who would have gone unallocated in the pure
capitation system. These are the cost savings from introducing competitive
bidding. On the other hand, the prospect of positive economic profits from winning in the auction stage means that providers reject more often for a given
capitation payment. Since patients cost more when allocated by auction than
by capitation, this second effect is a cost increase from adopting competitive
bidding. If the first effect (the darker rectangle in Figure 4.3) is greater than
the second effect (the lighter rectangle), the competitive bidding system dominates the capitation system.

4.6

Summary and Implications

This chapter presents a novel method of compensation intended to mitigate
the problem of risk selection. This compensation system works in two stages,
where providers can first agree to accept and treat patients in exchange for
a capitation payment. Providers can reject those patients they find unprofitable, but for each rejection, the provider must submit to the payer a minimum amount at which they would agree to treat the rejected patient. After
these initial acceptances, those patients who did not find a provider willing to
treat them are allocated to the lowest bidding provider, which is compensated
at a rate equal to the second lowest submitted amount. The chapter also models a compensation system based purely on capitation, and compares the two
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systems on the amount of risk selection and expected cost. Findings include,
first, that a mixed system dominates a pure competitive bidding system. Second, that risk selection occurs in equilibrium in a pure capitation system, and
never occurs in the mixed system. Finally, the model reveals sufficient conditions under which the mixed system dominates the pure capitation system.
A number of significant implications emerge from these findings. First, the
addition of a competitive bidding component to widely used capitation systems
can eliminate risk selection while preserving provider incentives to contain
costs. This does not mean that competitive bidding solves providers’ incentives to undertreat patients, only that it leaves them unchanged from those
under capitation or prospective payment. In this way, selection is reduced without increasing inefficiency and without introducing demand side cost sharing,
thus keeping consumers fully insured. Second, a competitive bidding component eliminates risk selection regardless of the number of unverifiable ex ante
consumer risk types (K) and the variance in match-specific treatment costs.
This suggests that costly risk adjustment schemes; where payers take steps
measure patient characteristics, estimate their effects on treatment costs, and
condition payments on the findings; would be unnecessary for overcoming risk
selection once competitive bidding is introduced. This is not to say that risk adjustment is entirely unwarranted, as this model does not investigate whether
partitioning the set of consumer risk types can reduce the price of health insurance overall. Third, capitation and competitive bidding are best utilized in
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a mixed allocation system. This is a departure from past efforts at designing
provider payment methods, where capitation and competitive bidding systems
have been mutually exclusive options.

4.7
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The production of health care and health insurance involves a set of complex
interactions among payers, health insurers, and providers. These interactions
are affected by the environment in which they take place, which includes a
variety of external factors that are subject to change. Many valuable contributions have been made by empirical studies attempting to estimate the effects
of changes in these external factors on the cost and quality of health care.
The subtleties in the behaviour that makes up these interactions can produce
unexpected results when external factors change, and so rigorous theoretical
analysis can offer insight when observed outcomes are difficult to explain.
This is the intended contribution of Chapters 2 and 3 to investigations
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studying defensive medicine. They provide explanations for seemingly inconsistent results across empirical studies, and reveal the potential for externalities and omitted variable bias. Both find that the relationships between malpractice pressure and health care spending and quality are non-monotonic,
both rising initially up to a threshold and declining thereafter. This can leave
defensive medicine hidden from empirical methods designed to investigate for
monotonic relationships. The fourth chapter utilizes auction theory in designing a mechanism for payers to compensate providers that mitigates risk selection while holding onto provider incentives to operate efficiently. It shows
sufficient conditions for a mixed system of capitation and competitive bidding
to dominate systems utilizing pure capitation or bidding.
These three chapters are the beginning of a research agenda including both
empirical and theoretical components. The empirical implications emerging
from the first two chapters suggest alternate specifications for investigating
the degree of defensive medicine practiced in today’s health care markets. Important to these new investigations is the use of access measures in a novel
way: to determine an observation’s equilibrium type or the prevailing equilibrium type of a given population. Regarding the theoretical component, the use
of auction theory in allocating patients across providers would benefit from further extensions. These include the use of common value auctions and two sided
auctions, where consumers have some input over the set of providers bidding
on their contract. This has the potential to reveal more information to payer,
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and thus overcome more problems created by information asymmetry.
While the debate surrounding the best way to structure health care markets may never be resolved, it is hoped that the findings in these three chapters
provide researchers and policymakers with new insight into payer-provider interactions and a sophisticated intuition for use in predicting the impacts of
malpractice reform and innovations in provider compensation.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2 Appendix

A.1

Proof of Proposition 2.1

Combining FOCs 2.1 and 2.2:



∂ Q̃
∂w



∂ Q̃
∂s


=

∂τ
∂w 
∂τ
∂s



and

w
∂ρ
=ρ− t
P
∂t
FOCs become:
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∂ Q̃
∂w



∂ Q̃
∂s



∂τ
∂w 
∂τ
∂s



=
...

2

1 − ρ + t ∂ρ
tP ∂∂t2ρ +
∂t
=
1− ρ
c + wt

w
t

...
− ∂ρ
1− ρ
∂t
=
2
w + ct
c − P t ∂∂t2ρ

(A.1)

Condition (A.1) is the same tangency condition necessary to solve the problem:

max
n,t


 

D
Q(n, t) =
n (1 − ρ)
q

subject

to

τ = Dn (ω(t; P ) + ct)


where

∂ρ
ω(t; P ) = P ρ − t
∂t



The isoquants in this problem are convex, but isocosts are not. It is thus
necessary to investigate whether there is a t in the choice set that can satisfy
Condition (A.1) when Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and if it does exist, whether
or not it is unique.
Existence of tangency point
Not only is it necessary to show that a t satisfying (A.1) exists, but it must
2
3
exist given that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, that is where ∂∂t2ρ + t ∂∂t3ρ < 0 in order
for that t to be an argmax.
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Figure A.1:

Existence of a point satisfying (A.1) in the range of t where Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
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An illustration of all points described can be found in Figure A.1. By Assumption 2, on the same isocost curve, there exists an interior level of treatment t̄ such that n is as high as where t = 0. Let Q̂ represent the level of quality
described by the isoquant that passes
 through the maximum n achievable on a
given isocost curve, defined as n t̂ where t̂ is the level of treatment at which
the maximum n is reached. Note that Q̂ > 0, t̂ > 0, and by Assumption 1,
3
∂2ρ
+ t ∂∂t3ρ < 0 holds for all t ≥ t̂. At { t̂, n t̂ }, the slope of the isocost curve is zero
∂t2
while the slope of the isoquant is negative. Also, since Q̂ > 0 and for a given
τ > 0, lim Q = 0, there is a level of treatment t̃ where the isoquant and isocost
t→0

intersect and the isoquant remains above the isocost for all t >t̃. Thus,
there

is a negative difference between isocost and isoquant for all t ∈
/ t̂, t̃ , at least a
 
subset of t̂, t̃ such that there is a positive distance, and zero distance at t̂ and
 
t̃. Note that all t ∈
/ t̂, t̃ are irrelevant alternatives, and thus the set of relevant
choices is compact.
At t̂, the values of n in the isoquant describing Q̂ and the isocost describing
τ are equal, while the slope of the isocost is greater than that of the isoquant.
This implies that, at t̂, the left side of (A.1) is less than the right side. At t̃, the
values of n in the isoquant describing Q̂ and the isocost describing τ are equal,
while the slope of the isocost is less than that of the isoquant. This implies
that, at t̃, the left side of (A.1) is greater than the right side. Since both isoquant and isocost are continuous,
by intermediate value theorem there exists

at least one point t? ∈ t̂, t̃ such that (A.1) holds. Since (A.1) is solely a function
of t, tangency will hold at t? for any n. Therefore, there always exists a point of
tangency in the region where Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Unique maximum
By subbing in the solution to the physician’s problem, (A.1) can be rearranged into:

w
c − P A(t)
=
P
c − P B(t)
2

(A.2)

where A(t) = (1 − ρ) t ∂∂t2ρ > 0 and B(t) = ∂ρ
< 0. Note from the physician’s
∂t
problem that for a given P , there is a unique finite t for any w ∈(0, P ), where t
is monotonically decreasing in w. Let:
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Figure A.2:

Illustration of uniqueness result. Even though (A.1) holds at w1 to w5 , only w1 can hold in equilibrium where Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.

h (w; P ) =

w
−
P

c − P A(t)
c − P B(t)

For an illustration, see Figure A.2. Conditions (A.1) and (A.2) are satisfied
where h (w; P ) = 0. From the physician’s problem, lim t = ∞ and lim t = 0.
w→0

w→P

This means that lim h (w; P ) = − 1 and lim h (w; P ) > 0. Since ρ is continuous,
w→0

w→P

by intermediate value theorem there exists at least one w such that h (w; P ) =
0. The first derivative of h (.) is:

P ∂t
1
∂h(.)
= + ∂w
∂w
P
where the sign of



ρ
1− ρ



∂h(.)
∂w

∂ 2ρ
∂t2

 ∂A
∂t

(c − P B) −

∂B
∂t
2

(c − P A)



(c − P B)

depends on the condition:


+

A (c − P B)
−
P (1 − ρ)2

∂h(.) >
0
∂w <
!
∂2ρ
> ∂ 2ρ
∂ 3ρ
∂t2
· h(.)
+
t
1− ρ
< ∂t2
∂t3
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Where the left side is greater than zero whenever h (w; P ) = 0. Let {w1 , w2 , ...}
be values of w such that h (w; P ) = 0, and let {t1 , t2 , ...} = {t(w1 ), t(w2 ), ...}. Let wi
be increasing in i, which implies that ti is decreasing in i. If any ti is such that
2
3
∂h(.)
≤ 0, then ∂∂t2ρ + t ∂∂t3ρ ≥ 0 at ti and, by Assumption 1, at all tj such that j > i.
∂w
2
3
Since we’ve already shown that a point of tangency exists where ∂∂t2ρ + t ∂∂t3ρ < 0,
and that h (w; P ) is continuous, it must be true that that t1 is the only element of the set {t1 , t2 , ...} that can hold in equilibrium where Assumptions 1
and 2 hold. Therefore, the level of treatment t? (c, P ) and revenue-per-patient
w? (c, P ) satisfying (1) and (2) are unique and depend only on c and P . The c is
suppressed in the remainder of this proof.
 2 
Multiplying both sides of FOC (1) by − P ns2 ∂∂t2ρ and adding each side to
each side of FOC (2) yields the necessary condition:



 2 
∂ρ
∂ ρ
∆U · −
= W M Uy · c − P t
∂t
∂t2

− ∂ρ
W M Uy
∂t
 2 =
∆U
c − P t ∂∂t2ρ
Substituting w? (P ) and t? (P ) into this condition leaves the left side unchanging in s while the right side is monotonically increasing in s through
its effect on n. There is thus a unique s? solving this necessary condition whenever τ ? > 0, and therefore a unique n? (w? , s? , P ) for any given P solving the
insurer’s first-order conditions. If this n? (w? , s? , P ) is less than Dq , then the
unique limited-access equilibrium is {w? , s? }. If it is greater than Dq , then the
n solving the insurer’s first-order conditions is infeasible and setting n = Dq on
the boundary dominates any n < Dq due to the uniqueness of n? (w? , s? , P ). This
would give rise to the full-access equilibrium, where t = Ds
. FOC (3) is the
q
same as the necessary condition above, with the exception that the left side is
also decreasing in s over all values that can hold in equilibrium. This means
that there is a unique s? in the full-access equilibrium, and that the full-access
equilibrium {ω s? ; Dq , P , s? } is also unique. 
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A.2

Proof of Proposition 2.2

Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that any equilibrium s? must occur to the right of
the global minimum of τ (s; n̄, P ), where τ (s; n̄, P ) is monotonically increasing in
s. The function can therefore be inverted, the inverse σ(τ ; n̄, P ) being resources
as a function of spending. Using the inverse, the insurer’s problem can be
rewritten with τ as the only choice variable:

max
τ

where



(1 − q) U (H1 , m − τ ) + qU (H2 , m − τ ) + q Q̃(τ, P )∆U
!
D · σ τ ; Dq , P
Q̃(τ, P ) = 1 − ρ
q

This problem yields the first-order condition:

q

∂Q
∂τ


∆U = W M Uy

and the comparative static:
 2 
∂ Q
−
q∆U
∂τ ∂P
dτ
 2  

=
 ∂Q 
∂W M Uy
∂ Q
dP
−
q ∂∆U
+
q∆U
∂τ
∂τ
∂τ 2
∂τ


∂W M Uy
∂P



M Uy
Since W M Uy > 0, ∂W∂P
< 0, ∂∆U
< 0,
∂τ
2
∂ Q
∂2Q
depends on the signs of ∂τ ∂P and ∂τ 2 .

∂ 2Q
=−
∂τ ∂P



D
q



∂ 2ρ
∂t2



D
q



∂Q
∂τ

> 0,

∂W M Uy
∂τ

∂σ ∂σ ∂ρ
+
∂P ∂τ
∂t



> 0, the sign of

∂ 2σ
∂τ ∂P



where,

−2  2
 


∂ 2σ
∂ 2ρ
∂ ρ
D ∂σ ∂ 2 ρ
∂ 3ρ
−1
=D
c − Pt 2
t 2 +P
+t 3
∂τ ∂P
∂t
∂t
q ∂P ∂t2
∂t

dτ
dP
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2

3

Since Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that ∂∂t2ρ + t ∂∂t3ρ < 0 in any equilibrium,
∂2Q
is positive as well.
is positive, and therefore ∂τ
∂P
∂ 2Q
=−
∂τ 2



D
q

"

∂ 2ρ
∂t2



D
q



∂σ
∂τ

2

∂ρ
+
∂t



∂ 2σ
∂τ 2

∂2σ
∂τ ∂P

#

where,

∂ 2σ
=P
∂τ 2



D2
q



∂s
∂τ

3 

∂ 2ρ
∂ 3ρ
+
t
∂t2
∂t3
2



3

Once again, Assumptions 1 and 2 make ∂∂t2ρ + t ∂∂t3ρ < 0 in any equilibrium.
2
2
This makes ∂∂τσ2 negative and thus ∂∂τQ2 negative. Along with the previously
2
?
∂2Q
mentioned signed expressions, ∂τ
> 0 and ∂∂τQ2 < 0 make dτ
unambiguously
∂P
dP
positive.
Since full-access equilibria are defined such that τ ? (P ) > τ̄ (P ), the marginal
change in spending produced by a marginal change in malpractice pressure
P to P 0 still leaves τ ? (P 0 ) > τ̄ (P 0 ). Therefore, a marginal change in P does
not precipitate a departure from the full-access equilibrium, and ñ remains
ñ?
= 0. 
unchanged. Thus, ∂∂P

A.3

Proof of Proposition 2.3

In the full-access equilibrium, the FOC with respect to s is:


q

∂Q
∂s




∆U = W M Uy

∂τ
∂s



Substituting for the first derivatives and rearranging yields:
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−

∂ρ
∂t




W M Uy
∆U
c − Pt




Ds
Ds
,P = J
,τ
H
q
q
∂2ρ
∂t2

=


Since τ = τ s; Dq , P in the full access equilibrium, this is an implicit function describing equilibrium resources (s? ). By the Implicit Function Theorem:

ds?
=
dP

−
∂H ∂t
∂t ∂s

∂H
∂P

−

∂J ∂τ
∂τ ∂P s
∂J ∂t
∂τ
− ∂J
∂t ∂s
∂τ ∂s

−



Where Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the denominator is unambiguously
nega
∂H
ds?
∂J ∂τ
tive. Therefore, dP will be positive if and only if ∂P − ∂τ ∂P s is positive for a
∂τ
given amount of resources. The expression for ∂H
> ∂J
can be rearranged
∂P
∂τ ∂P s
into:



!
∂∆U
∂y

∆U

W M Uy +

∂W M Uy 
<
∂τ

t · ∆U



∂2ρ
∂t2


∂ρ

q ρ − t ∂t

Since:
∂ω
∂ 2ρ
= − Pt 2
∂t
∂t 
∂τ
∂ 2ρ
= q c − Pt 2
∂t
∂t


∂ρ
ω =P ρ− t
∂t

∂ρ
− ∂t
W M Uy
 2 =
∆U
c − P t ∂∂t2ρ



−

∂ρ
∂t



∂2ρ

c − P t ∂t2



2 
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∂J ∂τ
can further be rearranged into J,w < 1,
The expression for ∂H
>
∂P
∂τ ∂P s
where x,y is the percent change in x due to a one-percent change in y and
?
M Uy
J = W∆U
. This expression implies ds
> 0, and since ñ? is constant in the
dP
?
?
Q̃?
full-access equilibrium, ds
> 0 implies that ∂t
> 0 and ∂∂P
> 0. 
dP
∂P

A.4

Proof of Proposition 2.4

From the physician’s problem, there is a unique level of treatment for any combination of w and P , defined as t(w, P ). From proposition 2.1, there is a unique
equilibrium w (w? ) and thus a unique equilibrium level of treatment for any
value of P , or t? (P ) = t(w? (P ), P ). The effect of a change in P on t? (P ) is thus:
∂t ∂w?
∂t?
=
+
∂P
∂w ∂P



∂t
∂P


w

Using comparative statics from the physician’s problem, this can be rearranged into:
∂t?
∂t
=
∂P
∂w
?



∂w?
−
∂P

w
P



?

?

is negative, then ∂t
is unambiguously positive. If ∂w
is positive, then
If ∂w
∂P
∂P
∂P
∂t?
w
∂w?
will be positive as long as P > ∂P . Using (A.2) where t = t? (P ), The first
∂P
derivative of w? (P ) can be written as:
 2
w
∂t
(c − P A)2 − P 2 A (A − B) −
P G(t) ∂w
∂w?
P
=
∂t
∂P
(c − P B)2 − P 2 G(t) ∂w
where G(t) = (c − P A) ∂B
−
∂t
as long as:
∂ 2ρ
∂ 3ρ
+
t
<
∂t2
∂t3

(c − P B) ∂A
. The denominator will be positive
∂t



ρ
1− ρ



∂ 2ρ
∂t2


+

A (c − P B)
P (1 − ρ)2
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The right side is positive, so Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that this inequality holds. The denominator is therefore positive. Equilibrium treatment is
increasing in P if and only if:

∂w?
w
>
P
∂P
...
B<A

Since B is negative and A is positive, this condition always holds, so

∂t?
∂P

> 0.



A.5

Proof of Proposition 2.5

Since the equilibrium values {w? , t? } = {w? (c, P ), t? (c, P )} depend only on c and
P , resources can be expressed as a function of τ and P alone. Let this function
be s = ψ(τ, P ):

τ = Dw? n? [w? , ψ(τ, P ), P ] + Dcψ(τ, P )
⇒

t
∂ψ
=
> 0,
∂τ
D (w + ct)

 

 ?
∂ψ
nt
w + ct
∂ 2ρ
∂t
=
−
c− t 2
−
∂P
w + ct
t
∂t
∂P

Since (A.1) must hold in equilibrium,

∂ψ
=
∂P



n
1− ρ

 

1−

∂ψ
∂P

w
P



can be rearranged into:

w  ∂t?
− t
P ∂P



1− ρ
w + ct



w
P
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Similar to Proposition 2.2, the insurer’s problem can be written in terms of
w and ψ(τ, P ), with τ being the choice variable:
?


max
τ

where

∂Q
∂τ



(1 − q) U (H1 , m − τ ) + qU (H2 , m − τ ) + qQ(τ, P )∆U


Dn? (w? , ψ, P )
Q(τ, P ) =
(1 − ρ(t? ))
q

Solving yields
the same first order condition as in Proposition 2.2, but where

2
1−ρ
= 1q w+ct
> 0 and ∂∂τQ2 = 0. The FOC can thus be simplifyied into:
1− ρ
W M Uy
=
w + ct
∆U

Applying the implicit function theorem yields the same comparative static
2
as in Proposition 2.2, with the exception that ∂∂τQ2 = 0, the signs of the terms in
the denominator are the same as in Proposition 2.1, making the denominator
?
will be determined by the
unambiguously negative. Therefore, the sign of ∂τ
∂P
sign of thenumerator. Breaking down each component of the numerator. Using
w
?
?
M Uy
1−ρ
Dn
Q̃(τ, P ) = Dn (wq ,ψ,P ) (1 − ρ(t? )) and (A.1), we find ∂W∂P
= − q ∂∆U
,
∂y q
w+ct P
 h
i
w
2
2
(1−ρ)
M Uy
∂ Q
∂ Q
1
P
=−
. Substituting the simplified forms of ∂W∂P
and ∂τ
and ∂τ
∂P
q
∂P
(w+ct)2
into the numerator of

∂τ ?
:
∂P

dτ
<0
dP


 2 
∂W M Uy
∂ Q
⇔
> q∆U
∂P
∂τ ∂P
...
τ<

Therefore, if and only if τ <

∆U
∂∆U
∂y

, then

∆U
∂∆U
∂y
dτ ?
dP

< 0. 
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